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Summary
1.	 Russia’s	policy	in	the	Middle	East	is	part	of	a	wider	strategy	aimed	
at	creating	an	international	order	which	would	shield	Russia	against	
Western	interference	in	its	internal	affairs	and	would	guarantee	it	an	
equal	footing	with	the	United	States.	In	practice,	that	means	that	Rus-
sia’s	Middle	Eastern	policy	 is	 subordinated	 to	 the	Kremlin’s	 global	
strategy	towards	Washington.	In	the	Middle	East,	Moscow	seeks	to	cre-
ate	a	regional	variant	of	what	it	believes	to	be	the	best	model	of	the	
international	order,	i.e.	a	concert	of	powers	that	would	include,	apart	
from	Russia,	also	the	regional	powers	of	Turkey	and	Iran,	as	well	as	the	
United	States;	provided	the	latter	shows	a	willingness	to	co-operate	
with	Russia	on	an	equal	footing	and	give	up	its	 ‘hegemonic	habits’.	
The	Kremlin’s	striving	to	restore	Russia’s	great	power	position	in	the	
Middle	East	has	also	served	to	legitimise	Putin’s	regime	in	the	eyes	
of	both	the	Russian	elite	and	Russian	population	at	large.
2.	 The	long-term	aim	of	Russia’s	policy	towards	Turkey	has	been	to	loosen	
the	ties	which	bind	Ankara	to	the	United	States,	NATO	and	the	West,	
and	to	incorporate	Turkey	as	a	‘junior	partner’	into	the	new	regional	
order	based	on	a	concert	of	powers.	As	a	part	of	that	policy,	Russia	
has	attempted	to	build	asymmetric	economic	ties	with	Turkey	that	
could	serve	to	exert	pressure	on	Ankara.	However,	Turkey’s	vulner-
ability	to	Russian	economic	pressure	turned	out	to	be	insufficient	to	
make	it	give	up	its	strategic	priorities,	which	Russia	has	been	forced	
to	respect	to	a	certain	degree.
3.	 Iran	is	emerging	as	the	most	important	strategic	partner	of	Russia	
in	the	Middle	East.	Even	though	the	Iranian-Russian	relations	are	
burdened	by	a	major	historical	record	of	mutual	distrust	and	marked	
by	rivalry,	and	despite	the	failure	of	attempts	to	develop	larger-scale	
economic	co-operation,	it	remains	a	shared	priority	for	the	two	coun-
tries	 to	undermine	the	US	position	 in	the	region.	For	this	reason,	
Moscow	and	Tehran	view	each	other	as	strategically	indispensable	
partners.
4.	 From	the	Kremlin’s	point	of	view,	the	main	aim	of	the	Russian	involve-
ment	 in	 Syria	was	 to	 stop	 the	Western,	 and	more	 specifically	 the	
American	policy	of	so-called	humanitarian	interventions.	The	Krem-
lin	saw	this	policy	as	geopolitically	motivated	and	feared	that	Russia	
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itself	might	ultimately	become	a	target.	The	Russian	intervention	was	
intended	to	demonstrate	to	Washington	the	limits	of	its	ability	to	influ-
ence	the	situation	in	the	Middle	East	and	show	that	the	US	would	have	
to	take	the	opinions	and	interests	of	Russia	into	account	as	an	indis-
pensable	player	in	the	region.	
5.	 Russia’s	success	in	salvaging	Bashar	al-Assad’s	regime	and	swinging	
the	relative	balance	of	power	in	the	Syrian	civil	war	in	his	favour	has	
clearly	buoyed	Moscow’s	ambitions	in	the	Middle	East.	If	Russia’s	policy	
in	the	region	was	reactive	and	defensive	in	the	first	years	of	its	involve-
ment	in	Syria	(from	2011 to	September	2015),	the	success,	at	least	in	the	
short	term,	of	the	use	of	force	has	encouraged	Moscow	to	try	and	build	
a	new	regional	order	in	which	Russia	would	play	a	key	role.	
6.	 The	greatest	risk	to	Russia’s	position	comes	from	the	Donald	Trump	
administration’s	anti-Iranian	course.	Russia	may	be	confronted	with	
a	choice	between	keeping	its	‘strategic	partnership’	with	Iran	or	facing	
direct	conflict	with	the	United	States.
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IntroductIon
The Russian military intervention in Syria began in autumn 2015 and was met 
with a wave of comments claiming that Russia had regained its global power 
position in the Middle East. The purpose of the present paper is to identify the 
nature of Russia’s position as a power in the Middle East and to trace the motives 
guiding the Kremlin’s Middle Eastern policy. The first part attempts to identify 
the place Middle Eastern policy occupies in the Kremlin’s overall foreign policy 
and Moscow’s priorities in the region. The second part describes the evolution 
of post-Soviet Russia’s Middle Eastern policy, pointing to its growing involve-
ment in the region on the one hand, and the instrumental nature of that involve-
ment on the other. Because the Russian military intervention in Syria has been 
the central element of Russia’s Middle Eastern policy since the autumn of 2015, 
the third part is devoted to analysing the reasons for and objectives of that inter-
vention. Parts four and five delve into Russia’s policy towards the countries 
it considers its most important regional partners, i.e. Turkey and Iran. Part six 
attempts to analyse the instruments with which Russia has built its position 
in the region and to assess the outcomes of its Middle Eastern policy and the 
challenges ahead of that policy.
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I. RussIa In the MIddle east  
– the geopolItIcal context
1. the global circumstances of Russia’s Middle eastern policy 
The Middle Eastern policy forms an integral part of the Kremlin’s global policy and 
is informed by the two fundamental notions underlying Russia’s overall foreign pol-
icy. The first	one	concerns	‘US-centrism’,1 i.e. the approach whereby the Russian 
establishment sees the United States as the main point of reference in its thinking 
about international policy and Russia’s place in the world. Since at least the mid-
1990s, Moscow’s main strategic objective internationally has been to undermine the 
United States’ power and to challenge the US-centric post-Cold War global order, 
while championing a new ‘multi-polar order’ (even if those aspirations were limited 
to political declarations before Vladimir Putin came to power). As a consequence 
of that approach, Russia has been using relations with other countries instrumen-
tally, with Moscow treating them as pawns or potential allies in its global game 
with Washington. The degree of that instrumentalisation would differ, but in nearly 
all cases Russia’s policy towards third countries took the American context into 
account. In the case of countries in the Middle East, as we will see below, that con-
text was decisive. In other words, Russia’s policy in the Middle East has been and 
remains subordinated to Moscow’s global strategy towards Washington.
A paradoxical aspect of the ‘US-centrism’ of the Kremlin’s policy is that, while 
Moscow seeks to undermine the US dominance, it also aspires to achieve Wash-
ington’s formal, or at least informal ‘recognition’ and acceptance as a global 
power standing on an equal footing. 
The	second	notion	that	informs	Russia’s	foreign	policy,	including	its	Middle	
Eastern	policy,	concerns	the	belief	that	Russia	is	predestined	to	be	global	
power, irrespective of objective constraints, especially those of an economic 
nature.2 That means Russia has a right to co-decide, on an equal footing with 
Washington, on any international issues that affect Russia’s interests. The Russian 
1 Bobo Lo was the first to note this aspect of Russia’s foreign policy. See: Russian Foreign 
Policy in the Post-Soviet Era, Houndmills, Basingstoke, New York, 2002, pp. 23, 173–174; 
Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, RIIA, London 2003, pp. 17, 25, 
128. In his latest book, Russia and the New World Disorder, London, New York 2015, he even 
referred to it as an ‘obsession’, pp. 98, 226. 
2 As Bobo Lo accurately observes, “the Russian ruling elite has come to regard global power 
status as an inalienable historical right, irrespective or Russia’s circumstances”, Russia and 
the New World Disorder, op. cit., p. 72.
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elite’s ideas of Russia’s great power status stem partly from the Soviet experience 
and reminiscences, and partly from a distorted perception of the United States’ 
policy and position. In line with those ideas, global power status entails the right 
to set the rules of the game on the international arena, and the right to either 
follow or disregard those rules on a discretionary basis. It also entails having 
a sphere of influence and a number client-states beyond that sphere (with varying 
levels of dependence). Financial pragmatism is an important characteristic of the 
Russian concept of global power status, which sets it apart from the older Soviet 
concept: Russia avoids subsidising its clients and allies and seeks to convert its 
political influence into business gains. It combines efforts to maximise influence 
and control with a tendency to minimise responsibilities and costs.3
Finally, foreign	policy	is	an	important	way	for	the	Kremlin	to	legitimise	
its	rule	vis-à-vis	the	Russian	elites	and	public,	and	in	the	last	two	or	three	
years	it	may	have	been	the	single	most	important	means	to	that	end. Both 
the elites and the Russian public perceived Russia’s loss of global power sta-
tus and the degradation of its international position in the 1990s as a painful 
humiliation. This is why any international moves which can be represented 
as a success for Russia in regaining its rightful status as a global power are wel-
comed with satisfaction by the Russian public and regarded as steps towards 
regaining dignity and ‘normality’.
2. ‘closer’ and ‘farther’ Middle east 
From	Moscow’s	point	of	view,	the	Middle	East	is	divided	into	two	funda-
mentally	different	zones.	The	first	one	consists	of	Turkey	and	Iran,	and	
the	second	one	consists	of	the	Arab	states	and	Israel. Turkey and Iran are 
adjacent to the post-Soviet area and are the Russian Federation’s neighbours 
across the Black and Caspian Sea basins. The two countries have long traditions 
of imperial statehood, major economic and military potentials, and growing 
regional ambitions. Both also have sufficient resources to effectively compete 
with Moscow for influence in the post-Soviet states, and even use soft power 
measures to influence fellow Muslims and ethnic compatriots within the Rus-
sian Federation. The other zone does not directly neighbour the post-Soviet area 
and none of the countries that constitute it have sufficient potential to effec-
tively aspire to regional power status.4 However, it is in that zone that religious 
3 Op. cit., p. 102.
4 Neither of the main pretenders to that role, i.e. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have sufficient 
potential to fulfil their regional aspirations. Saudi Arabia is not suffciently populous, and 
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and civilizational centres important to Russian Muslims are located (including 
Mecca, Cairo and Damascus). 
Because of those differences, Russia’s policy towards each of the zones is based 
on different assumptions. Turkey and Iran are seen in Moscow as serious geopo-
litical players and relations with them feature high on Russia’s political agenda. 
Moscow treats the two states as regional powers and views them as its partners 
in building the ‘multi-polar’ international order (at least in the regional dimen-
sion) and in stabilising the post-Soviet area. The other zone is not a long-term 
priority for the Kremlin because of the greater distance separating it from the 
post-Soviet area, and the absence of serious partners. It is symptomatic that all 
the versions of the Russian Federation’s official Foreign Policy Concept (released 
in 1993, 2000, 2008, 2013 and 2016) assign very low priority to the Middle East.5 
Compared to Iran and Turkey, Moscow treats the countries of this zone and 
relations with them more instrumentally and does not consider any of them 
as a potential long-term partner worth the investment of diplomatic efforts 
or economic measures.
This difference in Russia’s approach first became visible in the late 1990s. 
In 1998 Moscow started two large energy projects that laid a lasting founda-
tion for its relations with Turkey and Iran. In the case of Turkey, it was the Blue 
Stream gas pipeline on the Black Sea bed, due to which Russia became Turkey’s 
main gas supplier and Turkey became the second largest importer of Russian 
gas after Germany. In the case of Iran, it was the construction of the Bushehr 
nuclear power plant which made Russia Iran’s main partner in the pursuit of the 
most important objective from the point of view of Iran’s national ambitions, 
i.e. the development of nuclear technologies due to which Iran could become 
a nuclear-armed state or at least acquire the capacity to build nuclear weapons 
(‘threshold’ status). It is symptomatic that no similar ‘strategic’ projects were 
implemented with the Arab states, which Moscow saw primarily as potential 
economic partners and arms importers.
Egypt is not sufficiently wealthy. Their other weaknesses include the fact that their econo-
mies are resource-oriented and do not produce any advanced technologies, and their politi-
cal systems do not offer an attractive model for other states in the region to follow. 
5 As Dmitry Trenin observes, “In the hierarchy of Russian foreign policy objectives the Mid-
dle East is usually behind America, China and the main Asian states”. Россия на Ближнем 
Востоке: задачи, приоритеты, политические стимулы, Carnegie.ru, 21.04.2016, http://
carnegie.ru/2016/04/21/ru-pub-63388
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II. evolutIon of RussIa’s polIcy In the MIddle east
Post-Soviet	Russia’s	policy	in	the	Middle	East	can	be	split	into	at	least	four	
phases:	1992–2002;	2003–2010;	2011–2015;	and	2015 onwards. In each of them 
the policy objectives were different, and so was the region’s place on Russia’s 
list of priorities. The changes in Russia’s policy were dictated primarily by the 
changing wider context, and especially by developments in Moscow’s relations 
with Washington. 
1. the economy and focus on internal policy (1992–2002)
During	the	first	phase,	Russia	did	not	show	much	activity	in	the	region. Its 
policy was guided by purely mercantile motivations, treating the Middle East 
almost exclusively as a potentially promising market, especially for Russian 
arms, and as a potential source of investment capital.6 Russia was experienc-
ing a deep economic crisis at that time and was focused on restoring internal 
political stability, and was therefore simply unable to pursue an active policy 
in the region. That did not change even after Yevgeny Primakov, an oriental-
ist who had served as the Middle East envoy of the Communist Party’s Central 
Committee during Soviet times and had an extensive network of contacts three, 
was appointed Russia foreign minister in January 1996.
After the outbreak of the Second Chechen war in 1990 and Vladimir Putin’s rise 
to power, a	new	aspect	was	added	to	Russia’s	Middle	Eastern	policy	that	
was	strictly	related	to	internal	politics. At that time, Moscow made efforts 
to persuade Middle Eastern countries to restrain the Chechen independence 
movement’s capacity to raise funds and recruit militants, and to deprive the 
Chechen insurgency of religious legitimacy. The Kremlin seemed to understand 
that its policy aimed at strengthening the ‘official’ Islam loyal to the Russian 
state needed to be supported and legitimised by the religious centres of the 
Muslim world. 
To this end, Moscow made efforts to revive relations with Saudi Arabia, tra-
ditionally regarded as the political patron of Islam. Contacts between the two 
states had been de facto frozen since the outbreak of the First Chechen War. 
Moscow’s aim was to get Saudi Arabia to unequivocally back Russia’s policy 
on Chechnya (or at least to stop openly criticising that policy) and to block the 
6 A. Choumiline, La diplomatie russe au Moyen-Orient: retour à la géopolitique, Russie.Nei.
Visions, Issue 93, May 2016, p. 3.
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material and ideological support flowing to charities and educational founda-
tions promoting the fundamentalist Wahhabi Islam among Russian Muslims. 
The official visit of the Saudi crown prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz to Mos-
cow in September 2003 was a signal of normalisation, or even rapprochement 
between the two countries. During the visit, the Saudi leader (Abdulaziz was 
de facto ruling Saudi Arabia at that time because of King Fahd’s poor health) 
explicitly stated that the conflict in Chechnya was a Russian internal affair and 
should be regulated in line with Russian constitutional procedures.7 In return, 
Moscow declared support for the newly adopted, Saudi-sponsored Arab Peace 
Initiative for the Middle East.
Moscow’s political interest in normalising relations with Riyadh overlapped 
with economic interests, encompassing the co-ordination of policies to influ-
ence oil prices in global markets, the development of trade, and attracting Saudi 
investments in Russia.8
2. a return to the Middle east (2003–2011)
The improved economic and financial situation after 1999, marked symbolically 
by Russia’s early repayment of its foreign debt in 2003, enabled	Moscow	to	pur-
sue	a	more	active	policy	in	the	Middle	East. An impulse for that stepped up 
activity came from the 2003 crisis in Russian-American relations, caused by the 
US intervention in Iraq and the Kremlin’s belief that Washington was pursu-
ing an active policy to crowd out Russian influence in the post-Soviet area.9 
After two years of pursuing a detente in relations with the US, the Kremlin 
7 Interview with Abdullah bin Abdulaziz on 4  September 2003, http://izvestia.ru/
news/280837. In autumn the same year, official observers from the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference (and the Arab league) legitimised the presidential election in Chechnya 
organised by the Kremlin with their presence. Without the friendly stance of Saudi Ara-
bia, that would not have been possible. See: A. Малашенко, Фактор ислама в российской 
внешней политике, Россия в глобальной политике, 18.04.2007, http://www.global affairs.
ru/number/n_8391 
8 All those issues were present in the joint communique adopted on the occasion of the 
Saudi crown prince’s visit to Moscow in September 2003; http://www.kremlin.ru/supple-
ment/1712
9 This was how the Kremlin interpreted Washington’s objections against the Kozak Plan, 
i.e. the Russian initiative to resolve the frozen Transnistrian conflict in Moldova, which 
would give Russia decisive influence on Moldova’s foreign policy and authorise the presence 
of a Russian military contingent in that country. Similarly, the Kremlin interpreted the 
so-called ‘colour revolutions’ i.e. the mass protests against rigged elections which brought 
to power pro-Western political forces in Georgia (November 2003) and Ukraine (November 
2004–January 2005) as manifestations of Washington’s anti-Russian policy.
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reverted to the policy of ‘softly’ containing the American hegemony by building 
an anti-hegemonic coalition under the slogans of the ‘defence of multi-polarity’ 
(мультиполярность in Russian), formulated in the late 1990s by the then for-
eign minister Yevgeny Primakov. 
In	the	Middle	East,	this	policy	consisted	in	measures	to	actively	exploit	
tensions	emerging	between	Washington	and	its	traditional	allies	in	the	
region,	such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Russia offered those 
countries closer political contacts and economic and military-technological co-
operation, representing itself as a global power with a different view of regional 
issues and international order issues (such as the role of the UN, the use of force, 
humanitarian interventions, etc.), alternative to the one presented by the 
USA. While relations with Moscow could not fully replace ties with the United 
States for Russia’s partners in the Middle East, they offered them more room for 
manoeuvre and an additional bargaining chip in relations with Washington. 
At	the	same	time,	Russia	started	to	rebuild	–	on	new	terms	–	relations	with	
countries	which	used	to	be	the	Soviet	Union’s	clients,	such	as	Syria,	Libya	
and	Algeria. As a prerequisite, a solution had to be found for settling their old, 
Soviet-era debts. Between 2005 and 2008 Russia cancelled 73% of Syria’s debt 
of US$ 13.4 billion and the entire debt of Algeria and Libya of US$ 4.74 billion 
and US$ 4.5 billion, respectively. The debt forgiveness was linked to the benefi-
ciaries signing new multi-billion contracts, especially for arms supplies. This 
was particularly true for Algeria, which became the largest importer of Russian 
arms in the Middle East and North Africa.10 However,	it	was	Syria,	formerly	
the	Soviet	Union’s	main	ally,	that	had	the	closest	relations	with	Moscow. 
Mutual ties were particularly close in the military sphere. Syrian officers would 
receive training in Russian military academies, and the number of Russian mili-
tary advisers in Syria was estimated at 2,000 in 2006. Russia also renovated 
its supply and maintenance base in the port of Tartus, where it installed a new 
10 The new Libya not interested in Russian weapons, keeps mum on old debt, 9.09.2011, https://
sputniknews.com/analysis/20110909166590836/, A. Kreutz, Syria: Russia’s Best Asset 
in the Middle East, Russie.Nei.Visions, Issue 55, November 2010, pp. 14, 18–19; Mark N. Katz, 
Russia and Algeria: Partners or Competitors, http://digilib.gmu.edu/jspui/bitstream/han-
dle/1920/3016/Russia%20and%20Algeria.pdf?
According to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (calculations are the author’s own), the 
value of Russian arms exports to Algeria, which used to be between US$ 90 million and US$ 
380 million in the years 2000–2006, increased to between US$ 0.5 and US$ 1.5 billion a year 
in the years 2007–2011. 
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floating dock in 2009.11 The move could have been related to the Russian Navy’s 
plans, announced back in 2003, to re-establish a permanent Russian naval pres-
ence in the Mediterranean.12
Meanwhile,	the	Kremlin	was	building	an	image	of	Russia	as	a	global	power	
civilisationally	distinct	from	the	West	and	predestined	to	play	the	special	
role	of	a	bridge	between	the	West	and	the	Orient	because	of	its	special	ties	
to	the	Islamic	world.	
In a meeting with the mufti of Tajikistan in April 2003, Vladimir Putin said that 
Russia “could be regarded as part of the Islamic world in some sense”.13 In Sep-
tember the same year Putin declared that Russia wished to join the Organisa-
tion of the Islamic Conference as he delivered a guest address to the Organisa-
tion’s summit in Kuala Lumpur. In May 2004, Russia filed a formal application 
to be admitted as an observer.14
The Kremlin also frequently emphasised that Russia was the successor of the 
Soviet tradition of supporting anti-colonial aspirations against Western hegem-
ony. All those elements were present in Vladimir Putin’s speeches addressed 
to Muslim/Arab audiences and in bilateral declarations signed with Muslim 
state leaders.15
3. the Middle east as an ‘extended bulwark’ to defend putin’s 
regime (2011–2015)
Even though Russia’s policy became more active and its presence in the Middle 
East expanded in the years 2003–2010, the region remained of peripheral inter-
est to the Kremlin. In	2011,	however,	Russia	rapidly	stepped	up	its	involve-
ment	in	the	region	and	the	Middle	East	quickly	moved	up	the	list	of	priori-
ties. The Kremlin weighed in in Syria to defend the regime of President Bashar 
al-Assad which was threatened by the mass protests which broke out in the 
11 A. Kreutz, op. cit., pp. 18, 21.
12 M. Menkiszak, Responsibility to Protect…Itself? Russia’s Strategy towards the Crisis 
in Syria, FIIA Briefing Paper 131, May 2013, p. 6.
13 A. Малашенко, op. cit.; http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/28551
14 Выступление на Х встрече глав государств и правительств Организации Исламская 
конференция, 16.10.2003, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22160
15 See Vladimir Putin’s address at the summit of Islamic states in Kuala Lumpur (no. 14), as well 
as his interview for the Al-Jazeera television network, 16.10.2003, http://www.kremlin.ru/
events/president/transcripts/22162
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spring of 2011 and subsequently morphed into an armed rebellion. This	country	
became	the	focus	of	Russian	policy	in	the	Middle	East. During the first four 
years of the conflict (2011–2015), the Kremlin supported Assad using political 
and diplomatic means, above all trying to prevent a Western intervention like 
the one in Libya, and assisted the regime in the civil war by providing military 
equipment and by keeping military advisers in Syria. 
This	stepped-up	involvement	was	defensive	and	reactive	and	was	moti-
vated	by	the	Russian	leadership’s	specific	perception	of	the	Arab	Spring	
and	the	Western	intervention	in	Libya	as	potential	threats	not	only	to	Rus-
sian	interests	in	the	Middle	East,	but	also,	and	more	importantly,	to	Rus-
sia’s	internal	political	stability. This perception was based on closely inter-
linked ideological and geopolitical premises. The ideological premise concerned 
the Kremlin’s hostile attitude towards the Arab Spring as a mass movement 
aiming to topple authoritarian regimes. From the point of view of the Kremlin, 
any authoritarian regime which was toppled, especially under anti-corrup-
tion slogans, constituted a dangerous precedent and a potential model for the 
Russian people to follow.16 The Russian leadership also feared that a political 
mobilisation in defence of Islam and against a secular regime could become an 
attractive model for Muslim communities in Russia and in Central Asia. The geo-
political premise concerned the view that the Arab Spring was an American 
special operation designed to implement a policy of ‘controlled chaos’17 (the aim 
of this was thought to be to install pro-American regimes in the countries con-
cerned, in an alliance with the conservative Sunni monarchies: Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar), and to undermine the influence of Iran. The Kremlin was particularly 
alarmed by the intervention in Libya, which ended with the toppling and death 
of the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi.18 Moscow saw it as a precedent-set-
16 D. Trenin suggested, in slightly veiled language, that these were indeed the Kremlin’s con-
cerns, in the text Россия и кризис в Сирии, http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=50914
17 In the context of the Arab Spring, this term appears for instance in the collective report pre-
pared by a group of experts of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISI) which works 
for the Kremlin, Арабская весна: последствия для российской и мировой политики, 
Проблемы национальной стратегии, 2012, Issue 4, p. 8. The notion of the West using ‘con-
trolled chaos’ in the Middle East is also present in the writings of the guru of Russian strate-
gic thought, Marshall Makhmut Gareyev, Вызов принят, Военно-промышленный курьер, 
Issue 7, 24.02.2016.
18 Ibid., p. 10–19. It should be noted here that neither the efforts made by the Obama adminis-
tration to minimise the US military involvement in the operation in Libya, nor the fact that 
the initiative had come from France and the UK, which also shouldered the main burden 
of the operation, changed the perceptions in Russia where Washington was universally 
regarded as the main perpetrator. This distortion of Russian perceptions is a consequence 
of the specific ‘US-centrism’ of the Russian elites. 
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ting, successful application of Washington’s ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine. 
The	Kremlin	therefore	feared	that	the	next	possible	intervention,	this	
time	in	Syria,	could	create	a	domino	effect,	paving	the	way	to	a	similar	
operation	against	Iran	and,	ultimately,	perhaps	against	Russia	itself.19
Another important motivation for the Kremlin’s policy in Syria stemmed from 
the need to strengthen the Russian leadership’s internal legitimacy by dem-
onstrating to the Russian public that under Putin, Russia can regain interna-
tional influence and compete on an equal footing with the United States in the 
Middle East. Moscow’s aim, however, was not to build a sphere of influence 
or create a network of client states (which was beyond its economic and finan-
cial capacity), but to establish a position for itself in consequence of which all 
the other actors would always have to take Russia’s interests into account, and 
the states in the region would see Moscow as a valuable partner. The	strate-
gic	objective	of	Russia’s	involvement	in	the	Middle	Eastern	geopolitical	
game	was	to	strengthen	Moscow’s	position	vis-à-vis	the	United	States	and	
to	force	Washington	to	take	Russia’s	views	into	account	when	dealing	with	
regional	problems. This is why on the one hand Russia sought to undermine 
American influence in the region by blocking the moves of Washington and its 
regional allies and, on the other, it offered countries in the region an alternative 
to Washington in the form of political and military support as well as supplies 
of weapons and nuclear technologies (nuclear power plants) with no strings 
attached as regards the beneficiaries’ internal policies. In this, the Russian pol-
icy exploited the opaqueness and lack of consistency in the United States’ policy 
as well as Washington’s reluctance to become militarily involved in the region.
In this context, the principal objective of the Kremlin’s policy in the Middle 
East was not only to provisionally prevent another American/Western mili-
tary intervention, but also to create procedures and mechanisms that would 
19 Concerns about the Libyan scenario being replayed in Syria and Iran were voiced, 
among others, by the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov on 18  January 2012; http://
www.mid.ru/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/
content/id/174490  and http://www.mid.ru/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_
publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/174730 
The fact that the Russian leadership thought in terms of the ‘domino effect’ is also visible 
in a statement by the RISI director L. Reshetnikov who said: “If Russia had not taken a firm 
stance [on Syria – W.R.], today the Americans would be cleansing Tehran. Russia said ‘Stop 
the machine!’”, interview on 23.09.2013, http://www.stoletie.ru/rossiya_i_mir/leonid_re-
shetnikov_my_dolzhny_vybratsa_na_svoj_tretij_put_rossii_348.htm; See also a similar 
statement by Alexei Pushkov, chair of the foreign affairs committee of the lower house of 
the Russian parliament, as quoted in Menkiszak, op. cit., p. 9.
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allow Russia to more systematically restrict Washington’s room for manoeuvre 
on the international stage. As the foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov put it, the 
Americans “had to be taught that one can only do business on the basis of equal-
ity, balance of interests and mutual respect”.20 Thus,	Moscow’s	involvement	
in	defending	the	Assad	regime	was	primarily	instrumental	and was sub-
sidiary to a broader objective of Putin’s team, namely to create an international 
order that would generate as comfortable external conditions as possible for 
the Russian structures of power, especially in the event of an internal crisis.21 
The Russian propaganda message which said that the objective behind Mos-
cow’s involvement in Syria was not to save the Assad regime was therefore true 
to a certain extent. As Moscow supported Assad in his fight with the opposition 
and protected him against external pressure and the threat of a military inter-
vention by the West, Turkey or the Arab states, the Kremlin effectively treated 
the Syrian regime as its own crucial outpost in defending the Russian regime.22 
4. Intervention in syria: the Middle east as a ‘geopolitical lever’ 
(2015–2017) 
The	 direct	military	 intervention	 in	 Syria	 launched	 on	 30  September	
2015 marked	the	beginning	of	a	new	chapter	in	Russia’s	Middle	Eastern	
policy.	The	use	of	military	force	meant	a	qualitative	change	of	the	nature	
of	Russia’s	involvement	in	the	region	and	was	also	a	successful	attempt	
at	 taking	 over	 the	military	 and	political	 initiative	 and	 shifting	 from	
20 “Их надо приучать к тому, что дела можно вести только на основе равноправия, 
баланса интересов и взаимного уважения”. Interview on the show Воскресный вечер 
с Владимиром Соловьевым, 10.02.2013, http://www.mid.ru/press_service/minister_
speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/123866
21 D. Trenin phrased it accurately, even if somewhat abstractly, when he said: “In reality, the dif-
ference [between Russia and the West – W.R.] over Syria reflects the clash (противоборство 
in Russian) between distinct notions of the international order, problems of sovereignty 
and human rights, the use of force and the obligation to use force (instead of letting the 
conflict resolve itself)”. Россия и кризис в Сирии, op. cit.; the notion of the conflict in Syria 
as a ‘hybrid war’ directed by Washington is mentioned by Valery Gerasimov (chief of Gen-
eral Staff of the Russian Federation) in the text По опыту Сирии, Военно-промышленный 
курьер, 7.03.2016, Issue 9; see also the statement by Leonid Reshetnikov, the RISI direc-
tor, who said the following on the causes of the Arab Spring: “It is the result of external 
interference. Especially American interference (…). They thought: we will undermine one 
country, we will undermine another. We will rule.”, interview for Stoletije.ru, 23.09.2013, 
http://www.stoletie.ru/rossiya_i_mir/leonid_reshetnikov_my_dolzhny_vybratsa_na_
svoj_tretij_put_rossii_348.htm 
22 This is accurately reflected in the title of an analysis by M. Menkiszak “Responsibility to Pro-
tect…Itself? Russia’s Strategy towards the Crisis in Syria”, FIIA Briefing Paper, 131, May 2013. 
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a	defensive	and	reactive	policy	into	an	offensive	mode. Saving the Assad 
regime, whose forces had suffered a series of defeats in the first half of 2015 and 
had been pushed onto the defensive by the armed opposition, was an important, 
but nonetheless merely provisional objective of the intervention.23 In a broader 
sense, the political objective was to use the ‘window of opportunity’ created 
by the weakening of the United States’ position in the Middle East in order 
for Russia to re-establish itself as a major power in the region. A particularly 
important argument for doing so came from the Kremlin’s conviction that the 
outgoing Obama administration would not respond with stepped up involve-
ment, and certainly not military involvement, to a Russian intervention. This 
allowed Moscow to relatively safely use military power as the main instrument 
to rebuild its power position.
It seems that the Russian leadership did not treat regaining regional power 
status as an end in itself, but rather a means serving several other strategic 
objectives. First of all, the Kremlin intended to use its position in the Middle East 
to build up its legitimacy vis-à-vis the Russian public and elites who felt nostal-
gic about Russia’s former global power status and for whom the sense of being 
a power constituted an important element of their identity. Secondly, Russia’s 
stronger position and wider influence in the Middle East were intended to force 
the West to give up its policy of isolating Russia, and pave the way towards 
a kind of geopolitical deal. The core elements of that deal would concern the 
West’s acceptance of the Russian annexation of Crimea, and the implementation 
of the Minsk accords in line with Russia’s interpretation of them (i.e. the feder-
alisation of Ukraine with veto rights for Russia’s clients in Donbas). In return, 
Russia would co-operate with the West in the Middle East under the common 
banner of fighting Islamic terrorism. 
This is why the military intervention in Syria was preceded by a propaganda cam-
paign aimed at creating the false impression that Russia’s main aim was to fight 
terrorism. Vladimir Putin himself was involved in the campaign as he accused 
the United States at the UN General Assembly of destabilising the Middle East 
and indirectly supporting terrorism, and put forward a proposal for an inter-
national anti-terror alliance involving Russia (a proposal that had been made 
before). As a first step towards creating such an alliance, Moscow tried to estab-
lish a joint Russian-Iranian-Iraqi intelligence and command centre in Baghdad.24 
23 С. Минасян, Сирийский гамбит Москвы, Россия в глобальной политике, 23.11.2015, 
http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Siriiskii-gambit-Moskvy-17821
24 Under US pressure, Baghdad withdrew from those plans.
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The military intervention in support of the Assad regime required military and 
political co-operation with Tehran (see Chapter V). When it embarked upon 
this, Russia simultaneously undertook diplomatic measures to avoid a situa-
tion in which it would be seen in the region and in Washington as Iran’s ally. 
Nor did it want the intervention in Syria to be interpreted as taking sides in the 
Sunni-Shia conflict. Moscow therefore intensified diplomatic contacts with the 
Arab states, irrespective of their position on the Syrian conflict. On the one 
hand, it sought to build closer relations with Egypt, which had become its main 
partner in the Arab world after the military coup in July 2013 which brought the 
army commander-in-chief, marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to power. On the other, 
it maintained contacts and tried to develop economic co-operation with Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar, both of which were financially and logistically supporting the 
anti-Assad armed opposition. At the same time, it demonstrated it was prepared 
to accommodate the interests of Israel, which wanted to be able to prevent Teh-
ran from strengthening pro-Iranian groups in Syria and stop them from enter-
ing territories adjacent to the occupied Golan Heights. To this end, the Russian 
and Israeli military developed a mechanism to prevent incidents between the 
two states’ air forces in Syrian airspace, which allowed Israel to continue its air 
strikes in Syria without risking armed confrontation with Russia. Moscow also 
established military contacts with Jordan with the same purpose. 
Since	 the	end	of	2016,	Russia’s	aim	has	clearly	been	 to	use	 its	position	
in	Syria	to	build	a	three-party	format	with	the	other	regional	powers,	i.e.	
Iran	and	Turkey,	that	could	provide	a	formal	mechanism	through	which	
Russia	could	exert	a	decisive	influence	on	the	regulation	of	the	Syrian	
conflict.	It	seems	that	Russia	regards	such	a	mechanism	as	the	first	step	
towards	creating	a	new	regional	order	in	the	Middle	East, which would 
function without the United States or which would include the US as one of sev-
eral equal partners, rather than as a dominant power in the region. In this way, 
Moscow has been trying to create a regional-level precedent for an international 
order based on the principles of an ‘oligarchic’ concert of powers.
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III. the InteRventIon In syRIa – a case study
1. origins and objectives of the Russian military intervention
The military intervention in Syria launched on 30 September 2015 marked the 
culmination of Russia’s	involvement	in	the	Syrian	civil	war,	in	which	the	
Kremlin	had	consistently	backed	the	regime	of	Bashar	al-Assad.	The	aim	
of	the	intervention	was	to	swing	the	balance	in	the	battlefield	in	Assad’s	
favour, to enable the expansion of government-controlled territory, especially 
in the strategically important coastal provinces in the north-west of the country 
around Damascus, and to recapture Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city. The	aim	
of	the	operation	was	not	only	military,	but	also	political	and	psychologi-
cal.	It	was	intended	at	taking	away	the	opposition’s	hopes	of	winning	the	
military	confrontation	and	to	force	it	to	enter	direct	talks	with	the	Assad	
regime. Blocking the possibility of a military resolution of the conflict was also, 
perhaps primarily, intended to persuade	Washington	and	its	regional	allies	
to	agree	to	a	negotiation	process	in	a	Russian-proposed	formula. The most 
important element in that formula concerned the absence of any preconditions, 
which meant that the opposition, the regional powers backing it and Washing-
ton would have to give up their calls for Assad to resign or at least for an agreed 
pathway towards his departure. Another element concerned the so-called 
inclusiveness of the process (which amounted to a watering down of the oppo-
sition’s representation by including members of the ‘internal opposition’ loyal 
to Assad and politicians dependent on Moscow), and a simultaneous exclusion 
of ‘terror’ groups. An equally important objective was to limit the United States’ 
and its allies’ freedom to act militarily in Syria and, in the best case, to persuade 
Washington to co-ordinate its military activities with Russia through joint mili-
tary structures that would be established for that purpose. That, in turn, would 
lead to Washington recognising the Syrian regime as an ally in the fight against 
Islamic State (and other radical groups such as the al-Nusra Front) and the move 
would ultimately shield Assad against the threat of a direct US military inter-
vention in support of the opposition.
The	Russian	military	intervention	has	turned	out	to	be	successful,	at	least	
in	the	short	and	medium	term. It allowed Assad to gain a clear military advan-
tage over the opposition and push the latter onto the defensive, but also generated 
a number of side benefits for Moscow. Firstly, it created an additional impulse 
stimulating migration to Western Europe, which exacerbated the crisis in the 
European Union and boosted the ranks of those calling for the normalisation 
of relations with Russia, or even an alliance with Russia to fight terrorism and 
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to try to end the civil war in Syria along the lines of the scenario proposed by Mos-
cow. Secondly, Moscow’s decisive use of military force, which stood in contrast 
to the inconsistency of Washington’s policy and its reluctance to become militar-
ily involved in the region, generated political dividends for Moscow in the form 
of growing distrust of Washington on the part of the United States’ allies who 
realised that they would have to reach some agreement with Moscow.
2. Moscow’s peace initiatives
Russia’s policy in Syria was characterised by the combined, co-ordinated and 
flexible use of military and of diplomatic and political tools, and by an ambition 
to cash in the military wins by them being recognised politically – ideally by the 
United States. This is why, once it successfully weakened the Syrian opposition 
in the autumn of 2015, Russia made a series of attempts at creating a political 
mechanism in which Moscow would play a lead role and which would pave 
the way to ending the war on Assad’s terms. Already in December 2015, Mos-
cow obtained Washington’s approval for its formula of United Nations brokered 
negotiations between the Assad regime and the opposition. The formula did not 
rule out the possibility that Assad could remain in power and ‘watered down’ 
the opposition side by including the so-called Cairo-Moscow group consisting 
of the façade Syrian opposition loyal to the Assad regime and people from the 
Syrian diaspora in Moscow. The Kremlin also sought to gain legitimacy for the 
formula by obtaining a UN Security Council resolution (which was adopted 
on 18 December 2015) and a declaration of the International Syria Support Group 
(11 February 2016). 
Moscow also tried to persuade Washington to co-initiate and co-guarantee 
a ceasefire between Assad’s forces and the ‘moderate opposition’, and to estab-
lish a mechanism to co-ordinate the two countries’ armed operations in Syria. 
In this way, it wanted to achieve additional protection against possible US armed 
operations against Assad’s forces.25 It also sought to involve the United States 
in a process of which the ultimate aim was for Washington to accept the politi-
cal consequences of the Russian military intervention, i.e. to recognise Russia 
as the main political player in Syria and accept the Russian model of resolving 
the Syrian conflict. 
25 Moscow did not trust the declarations of the Barack Obama administration, nor similar 
declarations which came later from the Donald Trump administration, that the primary 
objective of US policy and the only reason for the US military presence in Syria is to destroy 
Islamic State. 
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That model consisted in forcing at least parts of the so-called moderate opposi-
tion – by threatening them with complete annihilation – to accept an agree-
ment with the Assad regime that would provide for no more than a superficial 
restructuring of the regime. Opposition representatives would be formally 
allowed to participate in the structures of power and would retain, at least 
during the transition period, direct control of the territory not yet captured 
by government forces (areas near the borders with Turkey, Israel and Jordan, 
and enclaves in the provinces of Homs and Damascus). The agreement would 
be internationally guaranteed and compliance would be controlled by a mul-
tilateral body established for that purpose, in which Russia would hold veto 
rights. In Syria, its execution would be supervised by structures built on the 
basis of the ceasefire monitoring centre created by the Russian armed forces 
in February 2016. Such a solution would reflect the model which Russia devel-
oped for internal conflicts in the post-Soviet states, and which could be called 
the ‘Tajik	model’.26
For the Russian side, the participation of Washington in such an agreement was 
also important for prestige reasons because it would put Russia in the position 
of being the United States’ formally equal partner, and one that actually had 
more influence in the Syrian context.27 The agreement with the United States 
on Syria was also expected to be helpful in ending	the	economic	sanctions	and	
the	West’s	attempts	diplomatically	and	politically	isolate	Russia.28 
However,	the	rapid	collapse	of	both	ceasefires	announced	jointly	by	Rus-
sia	and	the	United	States29	exposed	the	fundamental	differences	between	
the	Washington’s	and	Moscow’s	objectives	in	Syria. While fighting Islamic 
radicalism remained the main objective for the United States (and Washington’s 
26 It is not insignificant that Moscow also co-operated with Tehran to reach the agreement 
ending the Tajik civil war in 1997. The ‘Tajik model’ as a blueprint for Russia’s policy on Syria 
was mentioned by the leading Russian orientalist Irina Zvyagelskaya, Executive Summary. 
Conference on Russia, the West and the Future of the Middle East, (27.04.2012), p. 9, http://
www.ieis.lu/online/www/menu_vert/1152/220/221/content/2168/2351/463/ENG/Execu-
tive%20Summary%20Russia%202012%20final.pdf
27 The Russian elite would see that as a sort of settling of scores for the Dayton agreement 
which ended the civil war in Bosnia in 1995  – in that case, the roles were reversed: the 
Americans had set the agreement’s main parameters and then involved Russia in the for-
mal negotiations process to stop Moscow from trying to obstruct the agreement.
28 W. Rodkiewicz, The agreement between Russia and the United States on Syria: benefits 
for Moscow, OSW Analyses, 14.09.2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2016-09-16/agreement-between-russia-and-united-states-syria-benefits-moscow
29 The first one was announced on 22 February, and the second one on 9 September 2016. 
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approach to the civil war was entirely subordinated to that objective), for Russia 
the main aim was to strengthen its own position in Syria and undermine the 
position of the United States.
Even though the Obama administration ultimately refused to play the role 
which the Kremlin’s diplomacy wanted, Moscow still gained a lot from the 
ceasefire initiative and the diplomatic game surrounding it. Firstly, the initia-
tive created a propaganda ‘smokescreen’ for the Russian military intervention, 
and especially the Russian airstrikes on areas controlled by the moderate oppo-
sition; these claimed large numbers of civilian casualties. Secondly, it under-
mined Washington’s credibility in the eyes of the anti-Assad opposition and the 
regional US allies backing it. Finally, it cast the Obama administration in a bad 
light, thus weakening the campaign position of Hillary Clinton who had been 
part of that administration and who was perceived in the Kremlin as an anti-
Russian politician.30
3. towards a regional concert of powers 
When the September 2016 joint US-Russia ceasefire agreement collapsed, Mos-
cow started talks with Turkey and Iran to	create	a	new	international	format	
to	persuade	at	least	parts	of	the	armed	opposition	to	make	a	ceasefire	deal	
on	terms	favourable	to	the	Assad	regime, all the while militarily supporting 
the operations of the Syrian government forces and the pro-Iranian Shia for-
mations, including the Lebanese Hezbollah, against Aleppo (the last large city 
controlled by the opposition forces). On 20 December	2016,	the	foreign minis-
ters of Russia, Turkey and Iran issued a joint statement in which they endorsed 
the ceasefire idea, expressed support for negotiations aimed at working out an 
agreement between the opposition and the Syrian government, and pledged 
to jointly guarantee such an agreement.31
A breakthrough came with the ceasefire between the Syrian government and 
parts of the armed opposition, mainly those supported by Ankara (i.e. sections 
of the so-called Free Syrian Army), negotiated by Russia and Turkey. The cease-
fire agreement formally entered into force on 30 December 2016 and provided 
30 W. Rodkiewicz, Fiasko zawieszenia broni w Syrii: rosnące napięcie na linii Waszyng ton -
Moskwa, Analizy OSW, 5.10.2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2016-10-05/
fiasko-zawieszenia-broni-w-syrii-rosnace-napiecie-na-linii-waszyngton
31 http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/
id/2573489
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that all armed opposition groups except Islamic State and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham 
(formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) were welcome to join it. However, it did not address 
the question of the Kurdish self-defence formations PYD, which was the condi-
tion on which Ankara agreed to participate in the agreement. It also envisaged 
the creation of a joint Russian-Turkish verification mechanism. Iran was not 
a party to the agreement but declared its support.32
Under the agreement, Russia and Turkey jointly initiated the so-called Astana 
process. The stated aim of this was to achieve a consolidation of the ceasefire 
and to start political negotiations between the Syrian regime and the so-called 
moderate opposition (i.e. groups other than Islamic State and the former Jabhat 
al-Nusra). The process also marked the formal inclusion of Iran as the third 
guarantor of the ceasefire alongside Russia and Turkey. Its inaugural meeting 
was held on 23–24 January 2017 in the Kazakh capital Astana and was attended 
by the three guarantor states (Russia, Turkey and Iran), the Syrian government, 
and sections of the armed opposition, including a part of the Free Syrian Army 
and the Saudi-backed High Negotiating Committee of the Syrian Revolution 
and the Opposition Forces (HNC). The participants confirmed their willingness 
to observe the ceasefire but did not make any further concrete arrangements.33 
Six more meetings were organised between February and October 2017 within 
the framework of the Astana process, in which the participants tried to make 
the ceasefire mechanism more concrete and specific and to start negotia-
tions on a political deal between the opposition and the regime. In particular, 
in the fourth meeting on 4 May the creation of four ‘de-escalation zones’ was 
announced – the zones were the Idlib province neighbouring Turkey, the Homs 
province, the Eastern Ghouta region (east of Damascus) and the areas near the 
borders with Jordan and Israel. The scarcity and general nature of official infor-
mation about the arrangements made in the meetings indicate that the partici-
pants struggled to work out solutions and only reached very general, frame-
work conclusions which even then were not always implemented. For instance, 
Iran’s accession to the previously established Russian-Turkish commission 
32 Встреча с Министром обороны Сергеем Шойгу и Министром иностранных дел 
Сергеем Лавровым, 29.12.2016, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53627; Е. Су -
понина, Сирийское перемирие: Россия, Турция и Иран сделали то, чего не смогли 
США, 29.12.2016, https://ria.ru/world/20161229/1484924353.html
33 TASS, 19.01.2017. It seems that the creation of a joint mechanism for the guarantor states 
to supervise the ceasefire, as announced in Astana, never took place since there have been no 
public reports on its existence. Замглавы МИД Ирана рассказал о комитете по контролю 
за перемирием в Сирии, 25.01.2017, https://ria.ru/syria/20170125/1486439319.html
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“for considering the violations of the ceasefire regime”, announced after the 
third meeting, was not implemented, and the Russian and Turkish parts of the 
commission work separately.34 The announcement of the de-escalation zones 
on 4 May was also purely formal. In reality, ceasefire agreements for Eastern 
Ghouta and the Homs provinces could only be reached due to Egypt’s media-
tion – they were signed in Cairo on 20 July and 2 August 2017 respectively.35 
Likewise, the de-escalation zone near the border with Jordan and Israel could 
only be put in place after a ceasefire was negotiated with the involvement of the 
United States and Jordan and announced at a meeting between the presidents 
of Russia and the United States in Hamburg on 7 July 2017.36
Even though the Astana process made only limited progress towards its stated 
objective of brokering an agreement between the armed opposition and the 
regime, it offered many benefits to Russia. In particular, it institutionalised 
a consultation mechanism between Russia and the regional powers of Turkey 
and Iran. In this way, Moscow created a foundation for its projected regional 
concert of powers in which Russia itself would play a leading role and which 
would either exclude the United States or put it in the position of an observer.37 
Russia’s pivotal role in the concert would be a consequence of the fact that Mos-
cow’s relations with each of the partners are closer than those partners’ mutual 
relations. Moreover, in addition to its military might demonstrated in Syria, Rus-
sia has ties to other major actors in the region (such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt) that are closer than its partners’ relations with those countries. Finally, 
it is the only member of the projected concert with a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council. This would enable it to legitimise the concert’s decisions 
from the point of view of international law. The Astana process has also allowed 
Russia to build an image for itself of an actor seeking an end to the bloodshed 
and to resolve the conflict, but it has not prevented Russia from extending mili-
tary support to the Syrian government forces. As the opposition forces became 
enclosed in the de-escalation zones and bound by the ceasefire provisions, the 
34 As indicated by the contents of the daily newsletters published on the Russian Defence Min-
istry website, http://syria.mil.ru/syria/bulletins/bulletin.htm
35 Египет объявил о совместном с РФ успехе в достижении перемирия в Сирии, 3.08.2017, 
https://ria.ru/syria/20170803/1499685557.html; see also: A. Eltohamy, The limits of Egypt’s 
role in the Syria crisis, 9.08.2017, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/08/
egypt-sponsors-truce-deal-syria-homs-eastern-ghouta-role.html
36 G. Harris, U.S., Russia and Jordan Reach Deal for Cease-Fire in Part of Syria, 7.07.2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/us/politics/syria-ceasefire-agreement.html
37 The US formally had observer status in the Astana process (along with Jordan and the 
United Nations). 
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Assad regime, which did not have sufficient forces to actively conduct simultane-
ous operations in different parts of the country, could concentrate its offensive 
efforts on selected directions and further expand the territory under its control. 
The process also weakened the opposition, within which the question of involve-
ment in the Astana process triggered or deepened divisions, in some cases even 
leading to armed clashes between the different opposition forces.
4. the trump factor and what happens next for the us presence 
in syria
When Donald Trump took office as the president of the United States in January 
2017, Moscow hoped that it could reach an agreement on Syria with the new 
administration which could pave the way towards better bilateral relations 
on terms favourable to Moscow. Those hopes were based on Trump’s campaign 
pledges to put an end to liberal interventionism and to seek better relations with 
Russia guided by the American national interest defined in realpolitik terms. 
Moscow hoped that the Trump administration would treat fighting Islamic ter-
rorism as an absolute priority and therefore would accept the Moscow-proposed 
‘solution’ to the conflict in Syria. That solution would consist in an agreement 
between the Assad regime and parts of the Sunni opposition, imposed by the 
regional concert of powers (Russia, Iran, Turkey), under which the opposition 
would surrender in return for a cosmetic reconstruction of the Assad regime 
(the Tajik model).
Nevertheless, Moscow was worried to see the United States step up military 
activity in Syria in the first months of the new administration – the strengthen-
ing of the US contingent and increased support to the armed formation operat-
ing under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), i.e. the Kurdish-
Sunni coalition with the Kurdish YPG self-defence units at its core. 
The US airstrikes of 7 April 2017, which targeted the Syrian air base in Shayrat 
that was also used by the Russian air force, gave rise to temporary fears that 
– despite Trump’s campaign pledges – Washington could after all decide to go 
for a military intervention against Assad, seeing him as an ally of Iran and an 
obstacle in the fight against Islamic State.
Russia’s response to the attack was nonetheless fairly moderate, despite the 
harsh rhetoric, and was limited to suspending, for a short period, the memoran-
dum on the avoidance of air incidents between the air forces operating in Syria 
(this had been negotiated already under Barack Obama). Moscow quickly 
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came to the conclusion that the airstrike against Shayrat was merely a display 
of force and did foretell a change in US policy on the conflict in Syria in general 
or the Assad regime in particular. Based on this realisation, Moscow proceeded 
to make yet another attempt at finding a political formula around which an 
agreement with the Trump administration could be negotiated – on Russia’s 
terms, of course. In doing this, the Russian diplomacy tried to convince its 
American counterparts that Moscow’s main objective in Syria was to ‘untangle’ 
itself from the Syrian conflict.38
The negotiations in question resulted in a ceasefire agreement, with the oppo-
sition units backed by the US and Jordan in the Syrian parts of the Quneitra, 
Dara and As-Suwayda provinces bordering Jordan and Israel. The agreement 
was unveiled on 7 July 2017 during a meeting between the presidents of Russia 
and the United States at the G7 summit in Hamburg. The most important aspect 
of the agreement was that it did not prevent Iranian and pro-Iranian forces 
from accessing the Syrian provinces bordering Israel and Jordan.39 The agree-
ment did not take into account Israel’s postulates (Israel was not a party to the 
agreement but had been consulted) to create a sixty-kilometre buffer zone that 
would be off-limits to Iranian and pro-Iranian armed formations. Moscow went 
no further than to promise Tel Aviv that such armed groups would maintain 
a distance of five kilometres from the territory occupied by Israel.40
Another benefit of the agreement from the Kremlin’s point of view was that, 
shortly after the ceasefire deal was signed, the Trump administration decided 
to terminate the CIA programme launched in 2013  to train and arm some 
anti-Assad formations.41 The withdrawal of the Americans and American-
38 Talks to high-level members of the administration during an official OSW trip to Washing-
ton, late May 2017. 
39 The Russian press reported on the arrival of Iranian troops in the provinces of Quneitra and 
Dara, quoting sources in the Israeli intelligence services, Израиль нашел на карте Сирии 
иранскую угрозу, Коммерсант, 18.10.2017, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3441649. 
Representatives of the Trump administration denied that the July Russian–American 
agreement provided for Iran’s involvement in supervising the ceasefire announced on its 
basis in south-western Syria. However, the agreement concerned an area which partly 
overlapped with the de-escalation zone announced on 4 May in Astana. As one of the guar-
antors of the Astana accords Iran was therefore ‘authorised’ to send its military observers 
to the borders of the zone. 
40 The assurances were almost certainly informal, A. Harel, Israel Demanded 60km Buffer but 
Russia Let Iranian Forces in Syria Approach the Border, 15.09.2017, http://www.haaretz.
com/middle-east-news/syria/1.812328
41 Trump Ends Covert Plan to Arm Syrian Rebels, The Associated Press, 19.07.2017, https://
www.apnews.com/120e7113eafe4ceabd9b2cdd429f27a8
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backed units from the Zakf base in eastern Syria in September was also a good 
development for Russia.42 Whether the move was a consequence of Russian-
American negotiations on separating the zones where their local allies/clients 
were operating, or the Pentagon’s own initiative, it must have been interpreted 
in Moscow as a signal that Washington’s declared policy of containing Iran’s 
expansion in the Middle East did not mean that Washington was prepared 
to step up its presence in Syria – that is because the evacuation of the Zakf base 
enabled the Syrian government forces and the pro-Iranian formations backing 
them to reach the Syrian-Iraqi border. In this way, a land corridor was created 
linking the pro-Iranian armed formations operating in Syria and in Iraq.
Even though the pro-Assad formations did not completely stop attacking oppo-
sition units in the de-escalation zones after the Astana and Hamburg ceasefire 
deals, their main effort, and also the main effort of the Russian air force and spe-
cial services supporting them, was now focused on fighting Islamic State in the 
provinces of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. In this way, those formations entered a kind 
of race with the American-supported SDF units which would determine who 
will ‘liberate’ a larger part of the territory controlled by Islamic State. On the 
one hand, the Kremlin evidently did not believe in the Trump administration’s 
declarations that its sole objective in Syria was to fight Islamic State and that the 
United States would not become politically involved in Syria to create a lasting 
political foundation for its influence there. On the other hand, it clearly tried 
to avoid direct military conflict with the United States. To this end, it accepted 
the informal separation line between the pro-Assad forces and the SDF, which 
left the territories on the northern bank of the Euphrates under the control 
of the latter43 (along with Syria’s largest oil fields), but at the same time helped 
the pro-Assad formations establish a foothold on the northern bank of the river 
(where Russian engineering troops are now building three pontoon bridges for 
them), thus making a future offensive against the SDF technically possible.44
It seems that Russia’s aim is to persuade the United States to withdraw from 
Syria using political instruments. It is for this purpose that Russia has repeated 
decried the US military presence in Syria as a violation of international law and 
has accused the Americans of assisting Islamic State terrorists in their fight 
42 U.S. Troops, Terrorists Leave Base in Syrian Desert, 19.09.2017, http://kayhan.ir/en/
news/44387
43 P. Felgengauer, Syrian War and the Return of Zero-Sum Thinking in Russian-US Relations, 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, volume 14, Issue 120, 28.09.2017.
44 Н. Пальчиков, Меядин освобождён, Красная звезда, 16.10.2017.
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against government troops and of blocking humanitarian aid. Moscow’s alle-
gations that there is a humanitarian disaster in the Er-Rukban refugee camp45 
located in the American-controlled zone also serve the same purpose. Russia’s 
most important bid, however, will be to try to replace the United States as the 
‘patron’ of Syrian Kurds for whom Russia, due to its influence on the Assad 
regime, is the only country that can help them achieve their political objective, 
i.e. autonomy within the Syrian state. The official invitation for the Syrian Kurds 
to the Syrian National Dialogue Congress organised by Russia on 18 November 
2017 in Sochi to discuss a draft future Syrian constitution, was an indication 
that this will indeed be Russia’s game.46 
45 TASS, 25.10.2017; Минобороны обвинило США в прямой поддержке боевиков в Сирии, 
14.11.2017, https://ria.ru/syria/20171114/1508772123.html
46 Более тридцати организаций были приглашены на конгресс в Сочи по Сирии, 
31.10.2017, https://ria.ru/syria/20171031/1507942036.html
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Iv. polIcy towaRds tuRkey: econoMIc InstRuMents 
and geopolItIcal objectIves
The	policy	launched	by	the	Kremlin	in	2003 to	return	to	the	Middle	East	
as a global power by exploiting the rifts emerging between Washington and its 
Middle Eastern allies over the intervention in Iraq has	been	most	effective	
in	the	case	of	Turkey. The factors which contributed to its success, apart from 
Ankara’s objections to the intervention, and the decision by Germany, France 
and Belgium to block the military support which Turkey requested from NATO 
in February 2003,47 included the rise to power in Turkey of the pro-reform, mod-
erately Islamist AKP party led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. What played into Mos-
cow’s hands was that the Erdoğan team was seeking more independence from 
the United States in its foreign policy, was interested in economic co-operation 
and – in Moscow’s view – was less interested in questions of pan-Turkic solidar-
ity than the secular nationalists.
1. building a partnership
The new chapter in Turkish-Russian relations was opened by Vladimir Putin’s 
visit to Ankara in December 2004. During the visit, the	Russian	president	
encouraged	his	Turkish	counterpart	to	give	up	his	aspirations	to	integrate	
with	the	European	Union. Pointing to Turkey’s sense of being shunned by the 
West as something the two countries had in common, Putin suggested that 
Ankara and Moscow should build closer mutual relations. The US diplomacy 
noted on that occasion that the visit coincided with a stepped up effort by Rus-
sia to develop wider contacts within the conservative and religious communi-
ties in Turkey and to promote the ideology of Eurasianism among the Turkish 
elites (it was for this purpose that Putin’s official delegation included Alexander 
Dugin, the chief Eurasianism ideologue).48
Putin’s visit opened a period of intensively developing mutual relations. It was 
characterised by regular meetings between the heads of state and a gradual 
institutionalisation of political dialogue. Since 2004, Putin (or Dmitry Medvedev 
47 http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/10/international/worldspecial/nato-rift-widens-over-
defense-of-turkey-in-case.html
48 As per information obtained by the United States embassy in Ankara, see the report 
by ambassador Eric Edelman: Putin Visits Turkey: Russia Bids to Turn Turkey from West, 
10.12.2004, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ANKARA6887_a.html
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in the years 2008–2012) has met the Turkish leader at least once a year.49 In 2010, 
the two countries established a so-called High Level Co-operation Council, 
which was expected to meet once a year under the joint leadership of the state 
leaders, and a Strategic Planning Group under the leadership of foreign min-
isters. Moreover, Ankara and Moscow started military dialogue, focusing 
on the co-operation between the two countries’ navies with a view to build-
ing a joint security mechanism for the Black Sea basin. According to a Turkish 
expert quoted by a US diplomat, “the Russians have been exceptionally skilful 
in exploiting Turkey’s recently troubled relations with the U.S. and the EU”, 
in particular by emphasising their “willingness to be non-judgmental on issues 
such as human rights and civil-military relations”. This made Turkey feel that 
Russia was treating it with respect.50
Meanwhile, within the four years from 2004  to 2008, trade	between Rus-
sia and Turkey increased more than three-fold from around US$ 11 billion 
in 2004  to around US$ 37  billion in 2008. And even though the decrease 
in oil prices (and the related gas price) caused by the global economic crisis led 
to a temporary reduction in trade in 2009 (to US$ 19.6 billion), by 2012 the figure 
had risen to US$ 33 billion again. During the next two years the volume of trade 
remained at the level of US$ 31–32 billion but decreased suddenly to US$ 24 bil-
lion in 2015.51 In 2016, total Russian investments in Turkey reached US$ 9.3 bil-
lion, and total Turkish investments in Russia stood at US$ 1 billion (compared 
to US$ 4 billion in 2014).52 The single largest Russian investment in Turkey con-
sisted in Russia’s state-owned Sberbank acquiring DenizBank (one of Turkey’s 
largest banks) in 2013 for US$ 2.6 billion.53
49 H. Özdal, H.S. Özertem, K. Has, M.T. Demirtepe, Turkey-Russia Relations in the Post-Cold 
War Era, International Strategic Research Organization. July 2013, Tab. 1, p. 23. The table 
is incomplete, though, because it only includes the meetings that took part within the frame-
work of official bilateral visits. It does not include the meeting in Istanbul in June 2007 (on the 
occasion of the Black Sea summit) or Erdoğan’s visit to Moscow in August 2008. 
50 Turkey-Russia Relations: Into the Bear’s Den – diplomatic wire from the US embassy in Ankara 
of 21.05.2007, http://wikileaks.redfoxcenter.org/cable/2007/05/07ANKARA1215.html
51 N. Ulchenko, What is so Special About Russian-Turkish Economic Relations, Russian Ana-
lytical Digest, Issue 125, 25.03.2013, Tab. 1, p. 9; Российско-турецкие экономические 
отношения на новом этапе, Российский совет по международным делам, Moscow 
2016, p. 8. 
52 2016 figures by the Central Bank of Russia, www.cbr.ru (accessed on 7.05.2017); Turkish 
figures for 2014 quoted after N. Ulchenko, op. cit., p. 8.
53 http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/19677
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The	energy	sector	has	played	a	central	role	 in	the	development	of	eco-
nomic	relations	between	Russia	and	Turkey. Gas accounts for nearly half 
of Turkey’s imports from Russia (45.5% in 2012), while oil and petroleum prod-
ucts account for a further 20%.54 Russian gas exports to Turkey grew nearly 
150% (from 11.8 billion m3 to 27.3 billion m3) in the years 2002–2014, and Tur-
key’s share in Russia’s total gas exports increased from 6.9% to 12.7% in the 
same period. The share of Russian gas in Turkey’s total gas imports is around 
50–60%.55 In 2010, Russia agreed to build a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, 
Turkey. Russia’s state-owned Rosatom will fully finance and subsequently own 
and operate the plant. Turkey has committed to buying electricity at a fixed 
price for 15 years.56
From Turkey’s point of view, the export	of	services has also been important 
because it allowed the country to at least partly offset its high trade deficit (in the 
years 2007–2015, Turkey’s trade deficit with Russia ranged from US$ 14 billion 
to US$ 22 billion a year). The value of Turkey’s services exports, in particular 
construction services, increased between the years 2005 and 2012 from US$ 
4 billion to US$ 12 billion a year (reaching the highest positive balance of US$ 
8 billion in 2012).57 The influx of Russian tourists to Turkey played a similar 
role, as their number reached 4.5 million in 2014 following the mutual abolition 
of visas in 2011.58 
It	seems	that	the	Kremlin,	by	fostering	the	development	of	economic	ties	
with	Turkey,	 sought	 to	achieve	 several	 geopolitical	 objectives. Firstly, 
it wanted to give Erdoğan support and encouragement in his aspiration to make 
Turkey’s policy more independent from the United States. Secondly, it wanted 
to strengthen the tendencies within Turkey that were driving the country away 
from its aspirations to integrate with the European Union. Thirdly, it wanted 
to send a signal to Ankara to show that Moscow appreciated Erdoğan’s policy 
54 N. Ulchenko, op. cit., Tab. 2, p. 10.
55 Turkey-Russia Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 48 and chart 9, p. 49; S. Kardaś, At cross-
roads. Current problems of Russia’s gas sector, OSW Studies, March 2017, p. 68, https://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2017-03-27/crossroads-current-problems-russias-
gas-sector
56 Turkey-Russia Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 52. Moreover, the Russian side agreed 
to train the Turkish staff to operate the power plant. According to verbal reports by Turkish 
experts, the decisive factor for Ankara was that the Russian side was willing to give Turkey 
access to more advanced nuclear technologies than the Western companies.
57 Figures on the website of the Russian trade representation in Turkey, http://turkey.ved.gov.ru/ru/
58 T. Alaranta, Turkey’s New Russian Policy, FIIA Briefing Paper 175, March 2015, p. 5.
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in the post-Soviet area where Turkey avoided open rivalry with Russia and did 
not seek to undermine or weaken Russian influence. Finally, Moscow wanted 
to create an industrial lobby in Turkey that would be as wide and influential 
as possible and interested in preserving good relations with Russia. According 
to a Russian diplomat, the nature of Russian-Turkish relations in that period 
“was defined primarily by convergent approaches to bilateral relations and the 
fundamental parameters of the global order, based on a search for individual 
pathways in a rapidly changing multi-polar world”.59 
2. crisis in mutual relations
The	first	serious	test	for	the	developing	Russian-Turkish	relations	came	
with	Russia’s	war	with	Georgia	in	August	2008. Despite its close relations 
with Tbilisi, Ankara responded cautiously, taking a neutral stance on the con-
flict. Its strict adherence to the provisions of the Montreux Convention govern-
ing the access to the Black Sea of military vessels of non-Black Sea countries, 
which restricted the United States’ ability to step up its naval presence on the 
Black Sea, was seen in Moscow as the most important signal of Turkey’s readi-
ness to take Russia’s interests into account in the context of the conflict. Turkey’s 
reaction to the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was also restrained; while 
Ankara refused to formally recognise the annexation, it did not join the West-
ern sanctions and even consented to the opening of a direct ferry connection 
to the peninsula. 
Serious	tensions	emerged	between	Ankara	and	Moscow	over	their	treat-
ment	of	the	conflict	in	Syria. The Kremlin supported Assad from the outset, 
while Erdoğan sought to oust the Syrian president and supported the anti-Assad 
armed opposition. However, despite the various incidents (e.g. when in 2012 Tur-
key forced a Syrian passenger plane to land in order to confiscate the Russian 
military equipment it was carrying), both Moscow and Ankara tried to make 
sure that the differences over Syria did not adversely affect the general shape 
of their mutual relations.60 It seems that in relations with Erdoğan, the Kremlin 
adopted a similar tactic as it did with the other countries supporting the Syrian 
59 П. В. Стегний,	Вдвоем на «хартленде», 19.02.2015, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/
Vdvoem-na-khartlende-17312
60 S. Ananicz, W. Rodkiewicz, Turkish-Russian tension over the Syrian crisis, OSW Analyses, 
17.10.2012, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-10-17/turkish-russian-
tension-over-syrian-crisis
34
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
2/
20
17
opposition, i.e. it tried to keep up the appearance that it would be prepared 
to consider a solution involving Assad’s departure. 
The	Russian	military	 intervention	 in	 Syria	 exacerbated	 the	 tensions	
between	Ankara	and	Moscow, especially after the Russian air force targeted 
the Turkish-backed units of the anti-Assad opposition in northern and north-
western Syria, including units of the Turkish-speaking minority (the Syrian 
Turkmens).
In	November	2015,	those	tensions	morphed	into	open	conflict. The direct 
cause concerned the intensive airstrikes against the Turkmen units near the 
Turkish border carried out by the Russian air force, and the repeated viola-
tions of the Turkish border by Russian aircraft. On 24  November Turkey 
downed a Russian Su-24 bomber which had violated Turkish airspace. Moscow 
responded in very harsh terms, clearly seeking to escalate the conflict: it refused 
any contacts with the Turkish leadership, imposed economic and visa sanctions 
on Turkey (the cost of which to Turkey was estimated at around US$ 4 billion 
a year) and made the normalisation of relations conditional on Turkey agreeing 
to certain humiliating demands that Ankara could not accept (a public apol-
ogy, the payment of damages for the downed aircraft, and punishment for the 
persons responsible). At the same time, Moscow stepped up military operations 
against the Turkmens by supporting the Syrian government forces’ offensive 
heading towards the Turkish border.
At the same time, Russia also staged a propaganda offensive against Turkey. 
The Russian president, prime minister and foreign minister accused the Turk-
ish leadership of supporting Islamic State terrorists and, in particular, of acting 
as an intermediary in Islamic State’s oil trade (the Russian media also implied 
that the Turkish president’s son was involved in the trading operations).61 To 
further pressure Turkey, Russia allowed the Kurdish PYD party to open its 
first foreign office in Moscow and started to militarily support the YPG self-
defence units associated with the PYD, which were building a Kurdish para-
state in northern Syria (Russia provided them with arms and air support).62
61 W. Rodkiewicz, Russian-Turkish confrontation over Syria, OSW Analyses, 2.12.2015, https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-12-02/russian-turkish-confrontation-
over-syria 
62 M. A. Reynolds, Vladimir Putin, Godfather of Kurdistan?, 1.03.2016, http://nationalinter-
est.org/feature/vladimir-putin-godfather-kurdistan-15358
35
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
2/
20
17
It seems that by escalating tensions and accusing Turkey of supporting Islamic 
State, Moscow sought to discredit Ankara in the eyes of its Western allies in order 
to isolate Turkey and prevent it from having any influence on the terms on which 
the Syrian crisis would be resolved. The risk of an open Turkish-Russian conflict 
was also expected to create additional pressure on the United States and the 
European Union to accept the Russian-proposed solution for Syria, in which 
President Assad would be allowed to remain in power.63
3. compromise and pragmatic normalisation 
In	late	June	2016 Russia	substantially	revised	its	policy	towards	Turkey.	
Moscow	agreed	to	proceed	towards	the	normalisation	of	relations, even 
though the Turkish side had not met its demands: Turkey had not paid damages 
for the downed plane, and Erdoğan only expressed regret instead of an apology. 
An additional impulse for normalisation came from the firm support extended 
by the Russian leadership and President Putin personally to President Erdoğan 
at the time of Turkey’s internal crisis triggered by the attempted military coup 
in July 2016. The unequivocal nature of Russia’s reaction stood in contrast to the 
more ambivalent reactions of Western states.
The fact that Moscow was ready to close the downed aircraft affair with a com-
promise and to back Erdoğan on a crucial internal policy issue indicates that 
in	mid-2016 Moscow	concluded	that	it	needed	to	gain	Ankara’s	co-operation	
on	Syria,	at	least	in	the	short	term. That, in turn, required at least a tactical 
compromise involving mutual recognition of the two sides’ priority interests. 
The	 formula	 of	 that	 compromise	was probably sealed during President 
Erdoğan’s visit to St. Petersburg on 9 August 2016. On that occasion Russia gave 
the green light to the Turkish military operation in Syrian territory, which also 
involved units of the anti-Assad opposition. That effectively meant Russia’s con-
sent to Turkey taking over military control of a fragment of Syria’s border terri-
tory separating the Kurdish cantons of Afrin and Kobane. Turkey, on the other 
hand, de facto gave up its previously stated objective of removing Assad from 
power and most likely made a commitment not to attack his armed formations. 
Finally, the Turkish and Russian militaries established communication chan-
nels to prevent incidents. As a consequence of the compromise, on 24 August 
63 W. Rodkiewicz, Rosja eskaluje napięcie z Turcją, Analizy OSW, 3.02.2016, https://www.osw.
waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2016-02-03/rosja-eskaluje-napiecie-z-turcja 
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2016 Turkey launched its operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria.64 In the 
military dimension, the operation targeted Islamic State, but politically it was 
a move against the Kurds, the aim of which was to prevent the Kurdish YPG-
controlled areas east of the Euphrates from being joined with the Afrin canton 
further west.
President	Putin’s	visit	to	Turkey	on	10 October	2016 marked	a	partial	return	
to	the	pragmatic	partnership that used to characterise Moscow’s relations 
with Ankara before they were frozen in the autumn of 2015. The partnership 
involved the avoidance of open conflict, continuous discreet bargaining over 
contentious issues and a readiness to make partial, ad-hoc compromises. It also 
involved fostering the development of economic relations, although it did not 
rule out attempts – especially on the part of Russia – to instrumentally exploit 
those relations in order to put pressure on the other side. Hence, on the one 
hand, energy co-operation was reinstated during the visit as the two leaders 
signed an intergovernmental deal to build the Turkish Stream gas pipeline.65 
On the other hand, however, Moscow lifted only some of the previously imposed 
economic sanctions (the blockade on tourism and, partly, the embargo on agri-
cultural imports), while the visa restrictions for Turkish construction compa-
nies operating in the Russian market were kept in place, as was the embargo 
on the import of vegetables, which constituted the most valuable part of Turkey’s 
agricultural exports to Russia.
From the Russian point of view, normalising relations and resuming co-opera-
tion with Turkey had both short-term and long-term objectives. The	immedi-
ate	objective was to gain Turkey’s co-operation in driving the Syrian opposi-
tion forces away from Aleppo so that Assad’s forces holding the city under siege 
could recapture Syria’s second largest city without the need for continued Rus-
sian air strikes that were causing substantial damage to Russia’s international 
reputation. The	long-term	objective	was to involve Turkey in Russia’s efforts 
to develop a political formula to persuade the less radical sections of the Syr-
ian opposition to stop their armed operations against Assad. Co-operation with 
64 K. Strachota, Turkey and Russia: cooperation instead of conflict, OSW Analyses, 29.06.2016, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-06-29/turkey-and-russia-coop-
eration-instead-conflict; K. Strachota, J. Lang, Turecka interwencja w Syrii pod para-
solem rosyjskim, Analizy OSW, 24.08.2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/ana-
lizy/2016-08-24/turecka-interwencja-w-syrii-pod-parasolem-rosyjskim 
65 The agreement provides for the construction of the branches of the gas pipeline (with 
a capacity of 15.75 billion m3 each), one to supply gas to the Turkish market, and the other 
to transit Russian gas to European markets via Turkey. 
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Turkey was also intended to neutralise the Arab world’s perception of Russia 
as a patron of Shia Muslims and an ally of Iran, which was harmful for Moscow. 
Finally, in the context of Russia’s strong conflict with the West (especially the 
United States and France), provisional co-operation with Ankara was intended 
to demonstrate that Russia was not isolated and was able to pursue its objectives 
in Syria, not only without the consent of Western states, but also in defiance 
of their objections.66
66 M. Chudziak, S. Kardaś, W. Rodkiewicz, Turkey-Russia: partnership of convenience, OSW 
Analyses, 12.10.2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-10-12/turkey-
russia-partnership-convenience
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v. IRan – a gaMe wIthIn the Moscow–tehRan–
washIngton tRIangle 
Since	the	very	beginning	of	Vladimir	Putin’s	presidency,	Russia’s	relations	
with	Iran	have	been	part	of	the	game	with	the	United	States in which the 
main challenge has been to find an optimum balance between three contra-
dictory objectives. The first one is to keep,	or	ideally	strengthen,	the	‘stra-
tegic	partnership’	with	Iran; the second is to avoid	a	direct	confrontation	
with	the	United	States	and to minimise the negative impact of the Russian-
Iranian co-operation on Moscow’s relations with Washington; and the third, 
least important objective is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons 
or at least slow that process down. 
1. the development of the ‘strategic partnership’
The	 ‘strategic	 partnership’	 with	 Iran	 has	 been	 based	 on	 two	 pillars.	
The	first	one	concerns	Moscow’s	and	Tehran’s	perceived	shared	interest	
in	undermining	the	United	States’	power, even if Tehran is mainly interested 
in the regional dimension, and Moscow is interested in the global dimension. 
In the relations with Iran, Russia has profited from the fact that it has been 
Tehran’s only provider of arms and nuclear technologies and that, due to its veto 
rights in the UN Security Council, it could shield Tehran from Washington’s 
attempts to use the UN mechanisms to step up pressure on Iran. From Russia’s 
point of view, a very important element of the ‘strategic partnership’ concerns 
Iran’s behaviour in the post-Soviet area where Tehran has not only avoided 
rivalry with Moscow, but has also actively co-operated with Russia. The most 
important example of that policy concerns Iran’s co-operation with Moscow 
in brokering the agreement which ended the civil war in Tajikistan in 1997. 
Tehran persuaded the Islamic armed opposition to accept the agreement with 
the Russian-backed president Emomali Rahmon on terms which put the latter 
in a dominant position in the state.67 Iran also maintained economic relations 
with Armenia, Russia’s ally in the South Caucasus, helping the country survive 
during the blockade imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan. Finally, Moscow also 
67 Putin spoke with appreciation about the special nature of Russia and Iran’s co-operation 
in ending the war in Tajikistan in an interview for the media in Iran ahead of his visit 
to Tehran: “Iran greatly contributed to easing the situation in Tajikistan (…). It was indeed 
an exceptional situation in the post-Soviet space”, 16.10.2007, http://www.kremlin.ru/
events/president/transcripts/24603
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appreciates the fact that Tehran distanced itself from Chechen separatism and 
refrained from criticising Russia for its armed operations in Chechnya. 
Russia	has	used	its	co-operation	with	Iran	to	strengthen	its	bargaining	
position	vis-à-vis	the	United	States	by suggesting to Washington that it would 
be prepared to limit its contacts with Tehran in exchange for appropriate rec-
ompense.
Back in 1995, Moscow concluded a confidential intergovernmental agreement 
with the United States in which it agreed not to export any arms or military 
technology to Iran after 1999. In return, the United States exempted the Russian 
supplies under contracts already in place from US sanctions. However, Vladimir 
Putin withdrew from the agreement already in the autumn of 2000, taking 
advantage of the ‘deficit of attention’ in Washington caused by the change of the 
presidential administration, thus signalling to both Washington and Tehran 
that Moscow would not be willing to limit its relations with Iran. Despite US 
protests, Russia then resumed arms and military equipment supplies to Iran.68
2. Relations with Iran under pressure 
When in 2003 the Iranian opposition revealed information which clearly indi-
cated that Iran was working to develop nuclear weapons, Russia found itself 
under mounting pressure from the United States and the international com-
munity to restrict its co-operation with Tehran with regard to nuclear and mili-
tary technologies. Thus,	reconciling	the	contradictory	objectives	of	Russia’s	
policy	towards	Teheran	became	extremely	difficult. Moscow responded 
by formulating, on its own, additional conditions for its nuclear co-operation 
with Tehran (which was now supposed to return the spent nuclear fuel and 
refrain from enriching uranium to grades fit for use in nuclear weapons), and 
voted for three UN Security Council resolutions69 banning the export of nuclear 
technologies to Iran and imposing sanctions on a number of persons and actors 
associated with Iran’s nuclear programme. On the other hand, though, it used 
its position in the Security Council to mitigate the scope and severity of the 
68 For a list of weapons and equipment supplied in the years 2000–2009, see: H. Adomeit, 
Russland und Iran, (Wien, November 2009), Tab. 1, p. 17–18. According to SIPRI, the trans-
actions were worth around US$ 1.6 billion.
69 Resolutions 1737 of 23 December 2006; 1747 of 24 March 2007 and 1803 of 3 March 2008.
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sanctions, it continued to supply military equipment to Iran and carried on the 
delayed construction works on the Bushehr nuclear power plant.70
In the meantime, high-ranking Russian officials repeatedly stated that they 
did not have any information indicating that Iran was aiming to build nuclear 
weapons. Russian experts, on the other hand, would admit that Iran was devel-
oping nuclear weapons but argued that it needed them mostly for internal con-
solidation and that the weapons would pose a threat primarily to Israel and the 
United States, and not to Russia.71
An	important	revision	of	Russia’s	policy	on	Iran’s	nuclear	programme	
occurred	in	2010. At that time, Russia backed a new UN Security Council reso-
lution imposing further sanctions on Tehran (resolution 1929 of 9 June 2010). 
It also agreed, for the first time, to expand the embargo on supplies to Iran 
to include not only the materials and technologies needed for the development 
of nuclear weapons, but also a number of categories of arms. Moreover, the then 
Russian president Dmitry Medvedev further expanded the ban to include the 
S-300 missile systems, which Russia had concluded a contract with Iran for 
in 2007. Russia’s refusal to deliver the S-300 systems had real military conse-
quences for Iran in a situation when the country was under threat from possible 
US or Israeli airstrikes. The revision of Russia’s policy towards Tehran was prob-
ably a way for Moscow to return	the	favour	after	the	Obama	administration	
took	some	concrete	steps	as	part	of	its	new	‘reset’	policy	towards	Russia, 
in particular, after it scrapped the original plans to deploy elements of the US 
missile shield in Central Europe (10 interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar 
in the Czech Republic) and signed the new START treaty which was crucial for 
ensuring Russia’s strategic parity with the United States.72 
70 The complicated mutual manoeuvring over the continuation of work on the Bushehr plant 
are discussed in detail in: H. Adomeit, op. cit., pp. 24–26; see also: M. Kaczmarski, Russia 
plays the Iran card with the USA, OSW Analyses, 26.05.2010, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2010-05-26/russia-plays-iran-card-usa
71 See the opinions of Russian experts quoted in: Adomeit, op. cit., pp. 28–29, 31, 42. 
72 Kaczmarski, op. cit.; according to Fyodor Lukyanov, one of Russia’s best known interna-
tional affairs experts, the revision of the Kremlin’s policy towards Iran was “primar-
ily a matter of swapping the Iranian issue for the decision not to deploy elements of the 
missile shield in Eastern Europe”, Ф. Лукьянов, Сделка, война или смирение, Газета, 
29.07.2010, https://www.gazeta.ru/column/lukyanov/3402349.shtml 
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This display of Russia’s instrumental	approach to relations with Tehran led 
to a cooling of mutual relations. The most prominent manifestation of this came 
with the lawsuit filed by Iran against Russia for breaching the S-300 contract.
3. from ‘distrustful’ to ‘strategic’ partnership 
The	first	signs	of	a	new	rapprochement	between	Russia	and	Iran	could	
be	observed	in	2011 in	connection	with	the	two	countries’	similar	assess-
ment	 of	 the	 Arab	 Spring.	 Both Moscow and Tehran saw the upheavals 
as a potential threat to their internal orders and geopolitical positions in the 
Middle East. Both feared that the Arab Spring could lead to a strengthening 
of the United States in the region or an activation of radical Sunni movements. 
That would also entail a strengthening of Saudi Arabia, Tehran’s main geopo-
litical rival in the region. Based	on	this	assessment,	both	Iran	and	Russia	
became	 involved	 in	defending	the	Assad	regime	 in	Syria. When Russia 
launched its military intervention in the autumn of 2015, Moscow and Tehran 
became	de facto	allies	in	the	war,	which was an internal conflict in Syria but 
also a regional and global conflict between foreign powers supporting the dif-
ferent sides in the Syrian civil war. The intervention was preceded by at least 
several months of military consultations as part of which General Qasem 
Soleimani, commander of the elite unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps who was in charge of co-ordinating Iran’s military support for the Assad 
regime, visited Moscow in July 2015.73
As	a	result,	the	intensity	of	political	contacts	between	Russia	and	Iran	
reached	an	unprecedented	level.74 In particular, jointly conducting military 
operations required contacts to be developed between the military and secu-
rity services.75 In January 2015, the defence ministers of Russia and Iran signed 
a co-operation agreement providing for joint drills, contacts between military 
73 L. Bassam, T. Perry, How Iranian general plotted out Syrian assault in Moscow, 6.10.2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-soleimani-insigh-idUSKC-
N0S02BV20151006; Soleimani is on the UN sanctions list, which is probably the reason why 
the Russian authorities denied he was in Moscow. 
74 This is an assessment by Nikolai Kozhanov, the Russian political scientist specialising in Rus-
sia-Iran relations, in: Н. Кожанов, Оживление в российско-иранских отношениях, 
15.06.2015, http://carnegie.ru/2015/06/15/ru-60391/ial8 
75 The repeated trips to Moscow made in the years 2015–2016 by such functionaries as the 
National Security Council secretary, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, and the commander 
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Major General Qasem Soleimani (who oversees 
the operations of Iranian military and para-military formations in Syria), are probably just 
the tip of the iceberg, L. Bassam, T. Perry, op. cit.
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staffs and exchange of intelligence.76 Two joint centres for military information 
exchange and the co-ordination of activities were also created, one in Baghdad 
and the other in Damascus.77 The navies of both countries have held frequent 
joint exercises on the Caspian Sea for the last few years, and Iranian officers 
have often been invited to military drills in Russia. Co-operation on military 
technology has also been reinstated. In April 2015, President Putin repealed 
his predecessor’s decree banning the export anti-aircraft missiles to Iran and 
in early 2016, Russia delivered the first batch of the S-300 systems to Iran (the 
contract provides that Russia will deliver four divisions in total).78 Iran’s con-
sent for Russian bombers to use the Hamadan air base to carry out airstrikes 
in Syria in August 2016 was a telling example of the closeness of mutual military 
relations.79
However, the scope of economic co-operation between Russia and Iran has 
remained relatively modest, despite the two sides’ stated intentions and repeated 
efforts made by the bloc of economic ministries within the Russian government. 
Moscow hoped that Russian companies could benefit from the absence of com-
petition from Western businesses kept out by the Western sanctions (which 
Russia did not officially recognise) and build a strong position in the Iranian 
market, but this turned out to be a miscalculation. In reality, despite mutual 
efforts and declarations, Tehran and Moscow did not manage to shield their 
economic relations from the impact of the Western policy of sanctions. Nei-
ther the signature, in November 2014, of a new contract for the construction 
of two more units at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, worth an estimated US$ 
10 billion, nor the Russian pledge in November 2015 to grant Iran a loan of EUR 
76 В. Иваненко, Иранская ядерная программа и российско-иранские отношения, Проблемы 
национальной стратегии, 1, 2016, https://riss.ru/images/pdf/journal/2016/1/08_.pdf
77 According to Mehdi Sanai, the Iranian ambassador to Moscow, Iran and Russia “have organ-
ised co-operation in the areas of intelligence and joint operational and strategic actions 
in Syria”, Партнерство России и Ирана: текущее состояние и перспективы развития, 
(ed.) I. Ivanov, Moscow, 2017, p. 8, http://russiancouncil.ru/common/upload/RIAC-IRAS-
Russia-Iran-Report29.pdf
78 Interfax, 5.02.2016.
79 Партнерство России и Ирана: текущее состояние и перспективы развития, p. 32. 
While some in Iran protested against the move or criticised Russia for disclosing the fact, 
already in December the Iranian defence minister made clear that, in principle, there was 
no reason why Iran should not allow the Russians to use its bases again if the need arises. 
See the interview of 28  December 2016, http://www.iran.ru/news/analytics/104040/
Ministr_oborony_Irana_o_Rossii_Sirii_Turcii_Azerbaydzhane_i_Izraile. Given the post-
colonial sensitivities of the Iranian public and the memory of the Russian and Soviet mili-
tary interventions in Iran, that position shows just how important military co-operation 
in Syria with Russia is for Iran.
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5 billion for the implementation of investments by Russian companies, have 
had much impact.80 As a consequence, bilateral trade, which had been worth 
around US$ 4 billion a year in the period between 2001–2010, shrank to a mere 
US$ 1.2 billion in 2015.
It was only after the Western sanctions were lifted in the aftermath of the 
entry into force, in January 2016, of the international plan to freeze the Iranian 
nuclear programme that Russia and Iran were able to intensify mutual eco-
nomic co-operation. Moscow and Tehran then signed a number of deals, includ-
ing on the mutual protection of investments, the avoidance of double taxation 
and the facilitation of customs and visa procedures (visas were abolished for 
organised tourist groups). Work also commenced on the establishment of a free 
trade area between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union.81 In July 2016, Russia 
allocated EUR 2.2 billion out of the 5 billion promised in 2015 for the construc-
tion of a heat and power plant by an affiliate of the Russian state-owned Rostec 
and the electrification of Iran’s railways by the Russian Railways.82
Those efforts bore fruit in 2016 in the form of a rapid increase in the volume 
of total trade, which grew by 85% in 2016 (it was particularly significant in the 
context of the general decrease in Russia’s trade in that period). However, 
after the first two months of 2017, total trade, and especially Russian exports 
to Iran, plummeted again and the volume of trade between January and April 
2017 decreased by one third compared to the same period in 2016.83
The fate of the idea to organise a barter agreement of Iran’s oil for Russian 
industrial products testifies to the scale of difficulties hindering the develop-
ment of economic co-operation between Russia and Iran. The two countries 
signed a memorandum for that purpose in August 2014, but it was only in May 
2017 that Iran announced the conclusion of concrete transactions, the volume 
of which was nonetheless five times lower than had originally been envisaged 
(100,000 instead of 500,000 barrels of oil per month). Moreover, on 18 August 
2017, the Russian energy minister Alexander Novak revealed that the final 
80 Иран нашел средства для работ по строительству второго блока АЭС “Бушер”, 
13.09.2016, https://ria.ru/atomtec/20160913/1476796051.html
81 Партнерство России и Ирана: текущее состояние и перспективы развития, op. cit., 
pp. 8, 22, 25–26.
82 ОАО «РЖД» и Железные дороги Ирана подписали Меморандум о стратегическом 
сотрудничестве, Gudok.ru, 28.03.2017, https://www.gudok.ru/news/?ID=1368660; TASS, 
29.07.2016. 
83 Official statistics of the Russian Customs Service, http://www.customs.ru
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signature of all the necessary documents would only take place a month lat-
er.84 Even if the transactions ultimately come into effect, they will fall short 
of producing a qualitative change in the economic relations between the two 
states.85 The failure of the negotiations concerning the creation of a free trade 
zone between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union also indirectly demon-
strates the scale of difficulties in negotiating mutually beneficial economic deals 
between Russia and Iran. The parties have already announced that they would 
only sign a trade liberalisation agreement, and they have yet to agree on the 
customs rates.86
Even this short characterisation of Russian-Iranian economic relations shows 
that – unlike in the case of Turkey, where economic co-operation plays an 
important role – Russia’s relations with Iran are founded almost exclusively 
on geopolitical premises. In the words of Vladimir Sazhin, one of Russia’s lead-
ing Iran experts, “it is possible that Moscow’s priority interest concerns the fact 
that Tehran pursues a generally anti-Western policy in the global and regional 
dimension”.87 Both states are interested in weakening the role played by the 
United States in the region and have a common enemy – Sunni extremism. Those 
strategic priorities, combined with the successful experience of co-operation 
in Syria, even if it was not completely free of rivalry, make Russia Iran’s most 
important and closest strategic ally at this juncture.
84 RIA Novosti, 18.08.2017.
85 M. Bodner, Russia's Oil Bargain With Iran Has Political Overtones, The Moscow Times, 
9.06.2017, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russias-oil-bargin-with-iran-is-proba-
bly-politically-motivated-58173 
86 Делегация ЕАЭС провела переговоры по созданию ЗСТ с Ираном, 16.06.2017, https://
ria.ru/world/20170616/1496691104.html
87 See: Партнерство России и Ирана: текущее состояние и перспективы развития, 
op. cit., p. 22.
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vI. conclusIon 
1. the instruments of Russia’s Middle eastern policy
Russia’s success in strengthening its position in the Middle East was unexpected, 
given its limited instruments. The Kremlin’s unquestionable success in this 
regard runs counter to the widely held view that in the era of globalisation, 
it is economic potential and soft power that determine a state’s chances in com-
petition with other states. Russia has managed to regain its status as a major 
regional power despite the weakness of its economic tools. 
In the first decade of the 21st century, on several occasions Russia tried to stimu-
late the development of economic	co-operation	with the Middle East using 
political contacts at the highest level but, with the exception of Turkey, those 
efforts did not succeed to any significant degree. The level of economic co-
operation with the Middle East remains modest. In the early 2010s, the value 
of co-operation (trade, services) with the entire Arab world was around US$ 
10–12 billion a year (including US$ 6.5-7 billion total trade).88 Russian exports 
to countries of the ‘broader’ Middle East accounted for around 1.7% of total Rus-
sian exports in the years 2011–2013, rising to 2.1% and 2.5% in the years 2014 and 
2015, respectively.89 Trade with Israel (US$ 2.5–3 billion a year) and Iran (around 
US$ 4 billion a year) should be added to those figures. The only country which 
stands outside of this picture is Turkey, whose trade with Russia has reached 
US$ 30 billion. Egypt is the only Arab state to report trade with Russia exceed-
ing US$ 1 billion a year (US$ 2.2 billion in 2010, 2.8 billion in 2011, 5.5 billion 
in 2014).90
Russia has also been unable to attract major investment from the rich Arab 
states. Its co-operation with Qatar’s sovereign investment fund (Qatar Invest-
ment Authority, QIA), which invested around US$ 1 billion in shares of Russian 
88 В. Исаев, А. Филоник, Российско-арабские торгово-экономические отношения, Вос-
точная аналитика 2011, p.158, https://ivran.ru/f/Vostochnaya_analitika_2011.pdf
89 Based on the figures of: http://www.intracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/statistics-import-
country-product/
90 Russia’s foreign trade exchange figures as per the statistics of the Federal Customs Service, 
www.customs.ru. Figures on total Russian-Egyptian trade in 2014 are based on an inter-
view with the Russian ambassador in Egypt, 29.06.2016, http://www.mid.ru/sovesanie-
poslov-i-postoannyh-predstavitelej-rossijskoj-federacii-30-iuna-1-iula-2016-g./-/asset_
publisher/sznBmO7t6LBS/content/id/2338542 
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companies in the years 2013–2016, is an exception here.91 In December 2016, the 
QIA also took part in the privatisation of the Russian oil giant Rosneft, buying 
a stake in the company for US$ 2.5 billion. However, there are many indications 
that in reality, the QIA only acted as a ‘smokescreen’ to conceal the fact that the 
transaction was financed by Russian banks.92
In a situation where the significance of its economic co-operation with coun-
tries of the Middle East (except Turkey) has been marginal, Russia has managed 
to rebuild its position in the region primarily using military	and	political-
diplomatic	means. The intervention in Syria demonstrated the country’s abil-
ity to carry out an expeditionary military operation in the region. Its military 
potential has turned out to be sufficient to swing the balance in the Syrian civil 
war and force actors in the region and beyond – such as Israel, Turkey, Jordan 
and even the United States – to negotiate the parameters of their military activ-
ity in Syria with Moscow.93 The military	personnel inherited by Russia from 
the Soviet Union with its experience in working in the region and co-operating 
with local military forces, has been a valuable asset in Russia’s arsenal of instru-
ments. Military units composed of Russian Muslims (Chechens, Ingush) have 
also been an asset for Russia in the Middle East (currently in Syria, previously 
in Lebanon).94 Moreover, there is a significant amount of officers who have stud-
ied in Soviet and Russian military academies in the armies of a number of Mid-
dle Eastern states (Syria, Lebanon, Yemen), as well as in Algeria.
91 In 2013, it invested US$ 500 million in the shares of the VTB bank, Л. Исаев, А. Коротаев, 
Забыть о Сирии: почему Катар заинтересовался «Роснефтью», 20.12.2016, http://carn-
egie.ru/commentary/?fa=66505; in August 2016, it invested US$ 400 million (in conjunc-
tion with the sovereign investment fund of the United Arab Emirates) in the shares of the 
diamond producer Alrosa, RIA Novosti, 5.08.2016, and in September 2016 – US$ 269 million 
in the Pulkovo airport near St. Petersburg, TASS, 8.12.2016. 
92 S. Kardaś, A murky deal: a 19.5% stake in Rosneft has been sold, OSW Analyses, 14.12.2016, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-12-14/a-murky-deal-a-195-stake-
rosneft-has-been-sold
В приватизации «Роснефти» принял участие ВТБ, rbc.ru, 16.01.2017, http://www.rbc.
ru/economics/16/01/2017/587d01469a7947eff3e09eaa
93 Russia has turned out to be able to airlift, deploy and maintain a relatively strong and well-
armed air formation in the Middle East, consisting of up to 40 aircraft and dozens of helicop-
ters supported by a land force of around 3.000 troops armed with heavy equipment (includ-
ing tanks, heavy artillery and air defence systems). Within ten months (between mid-Sep-
tember 2015 and end of July 2016) the formation carried out more than 11.000 sorties, see: 
М. Шеповаленко (red.), Сирийский рубеж, Центр анализа стратегий и технологий, 
Moscow, 2016, pp. 106–119. 
94 N. Hauer, Putin Has a New Secret Weapon in Syria: Chechens, 4.05.2017, http://foreign-
policy.com/2017/05/04/putin-has-a-new-secret-weapon-in-syria-chechens/
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Arms	 exports have been an important element of the Russian presence 
and influence in the region. According to the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), in the years 2000–2015, Russia sold US$ 16-17 billion 
worth of arms to Middle Eastern and North African states, which accounted for 
around 17–18% of Russia’s total arms exports in that period. Still, just one state, 
Algeria, accounted for nearly half of that sum (US$ 7.8 billion). Other major 
buyers, which spent between US$ 1 billion and US$ 1.6 billion on Russian arms, 
included: Egypt, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Sudan.95
It should be noted that Russia’s share in total arms supplies to the region has 
been rather modest, e.g. in the years 2012–2016 Russian exports accounted for 
less than 8% of the total. Moscow has been a major arms supplier to two states 
only: Algeria (60%) and Iraq (23%).96 
However, from the point of view of the Kremlin’s ability to use arms supplies 
as a tool of political influence, it is not so much the total volume of supplies that 
matters, as Moscow’s readiness and willingness to deliver relatively advanced 
and relatively inexpensive weapons systems to states which are either in con-
flict with the West (Iran, Syria), or are looking for an alternative to Western 
suppliers for political reasons (Egypt, Iraq).
The crucial factor, though, concerns Russia’s readiness to continue military 
supplies to a government that is involved in a bloody and protracted civil 
war, as demonstrated during the campaign in Syria.97 It is also important that 
as a potential ally, Russia has proven to be insensitive to criticism and pressure 
from international public opinion and the media, which decried the notorious 
attacks (and especially airstrikes) by the Syrian government forces on civilian 
targets, including using chemical weapons.
It should nonetheless be noted that Russia’s use of military instruments has been 
closely linked to diplomatic measures. This close link between diplomatic and 
military instruments has been a characteristic feature and strength of Russia’s 
policy in the region. Russia’s	veto	rights	in	the	UN	Security	Council	have	also	
95 Author’s own calculations based on SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, 1.11.2016.
96 A. Fleurant, P.D. Wezeman, S.T. Wezeman, Nan Tian, Trends in International Arms Trans-
fers, 2016, SIPR, February 2017), p. 6, Tab. 2, p. 10, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/
Trends-in-international-arms-transfers-2016.pdf
97 Russian military experts estimate that Russian warships delivered 150.000 tonnes of cargo 
to the port of Tartus in the second half of 2015 alone. Сирийский рубеж, op. cit. p. 130.
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been	a	crucial	element	in	this	regard	as they allow Moscow to block actions 
by other states even if Russia itself is isolated. The fact that Russia resorted to the 
veto on eight occasions during the six years of its involvement in the defence 
of the Assad regime (backed by China on six occasions) shows just how impor-
tant this instrument is.
Another important asset of the Russian diplomacy in the Middle East concerns 
its ability to draw on the long record of the Russian presence in the region. 
Thanks to that record, Russia has diplomatic cadres which know the language 
and the local traditions, and which benefit from wide networks of contacts.98 
Russia can also draw on the knowledge of Russian oriental studies scholars.
Moreover, Russia’s Middle Eastern diplomacy has benefited from the confes-
sional	factor. On the one hand, Moscow has encouraged the Russian Federa-
tion republics (subjects) inhabited by traditionally Muslim nations to develop 
economic relations and contacts with the Middle East.99 On the other, it has 
closely monitored and ‘co-ordinated’ such contacts through special representa-
tions of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs established especially for that 
purpose in the different Federation subjects already in the 1990s. 
Paradoxically, Moscow has also been using the Russian	Orthodox	Church 
in its Middle Eastern policy, especially for the purpose of building an image 
of itself among Christian communities in the West (the Roman Catholic Church 
in Europe, and the conservative protestants in the United States) as a country 
which defends Christians against Islamic extremism and thus legitimising its 
support for the Assad regime. Patriarch Kirill personally met the Syrian presi-
dent in Damascus as late as autumn 2011, and officially expressed support for the 
Russian armed intervention in Syria (which he characterised as a fight against 
terrorism) and for Assad’s regime.100
98 Mikhail Bogdanov, deputy minister of foreign affairs and the Russian president’s special 
envoy for the Middle East and North Africa, may serve as an example of such a diplomat. 
See the official biography at: http://www.mid.ru/about/structure/deputy_ministers/-/
asset_publisher/7AT17IymWZWQ/content/id/647875 
99 See e.g. the most recent visit to Iran by a Tatarstan delegation with president Rustam 
Minnikhanov, http://www.tatar-inform.ru/news/2017/04/19/549386
100 See the reports on the patriarch’s meeting with a Syrian governmental delegation 
on 7 March 2017, https://mospat.ru/en/2017/03/07/news143343/ 
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2. outcomes and outlook for the future
Whether or not the United States ultimately withdraws from Syria completely 
and accepts the Russian-proposed formula for ending the civil war, Russia’s 
status as a global power in the Middle East, gained via its military interven-
tion in Syria, will remain a fact. It could only be challenged by a fundamental 
change in US policy and a move towards stepping up US involvement in the 
Middle East and military pressure being brought to bear on the Assad regime. 
Under President Obama such a change was out of the question. Donald Trump 
has never shown any interest in removing Assad from power and has been even 
more determined than his predecessor to reduce the United States’ role in Syria 
to fighting Islamic State. However, unlike President Obama, President Trump 
believes that the Sunni radicals from Islamic State are not America’s only ene-
mies in the Middle East; the other enemy is Iran. For now, Washington seems 
to believe that it can counter Iran’s influence without the need for a direct con-
frontation with Russia. However, the anti-Iranian policy of the Trump admin-
istration may lead to a situation in which Russia will have to choose between 
keeping its ‘strategic partnership’ with Tehran and facing a direct confrontation 
with the United States in the Middle East. At the same time, it is clear that Russia 
will try to avoid having to make that choice as long as it can.
There is also the question of the tangible benefits, especially the economic ben-
efits, that Russia can derive from its involvement in the Middle East. There is no 
clear way in which it could convert its successes in the Middle East into practical 
gains. The prospect of using its position in the Middle East to strike a geopoliti-
cal deal with Washington and Berlin, under which the West would recognise 
Eastern Europe as a Russian sphere of influence and Central Europe as a buffer 
zone, or at least make some concessions over Ukraine (lift sanctions, accept the 
Russian interpretation of the Minsk accords) has turned out to be illusory and 
there are no indications that the Western side could be willing to make such 
a bargain.
Stopping the ‘domino of colour revolutions’ has also been an illusory gain, 
as such a domino existed only in the political imagination of the Kremlin elite. 
Neither are there any signs that Russia’s greater political role in the region could 
translate into economic gains. Even in terms of arms exports, Moscow’s policy 
in Syria has barred Russia access to the most lucrative markets of the oil-rich 
states in the Arab Peninsula.
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